The University of Akron

IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review

Akron Law Journals

July 2015

Biological Evaluations: Blood, Genes, and Family
Janet L. Dolgin

Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Family Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Dolgin, Janet L. (2008) "Biological Evaluations: Blood, Genes, and Family," Akron Law Review: Vol. 41 : Iss. 2 ,
Article 2.
Available at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol41/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.

Dolgin: Biological Evaluations
DOLGIN_FINAL

3/23/2009 2:51 PM

BIOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS: BLOOD, GENES, AND
FAMILY
Janet L. Dolgin*

I.
II.
III.
IV.

V.

Introduction ....................................................................... 347
The “Traditional” Family .................................................. 351
New Forms of Family: The Predominance of
Autonomous Individuality ................................................. 354
Perceptions of Blood and Perceptions of Genes: “New
Families for Old” ............................................................... 364
A. “Flesh and Blood” Families: “DNA” Substitutes for
“Biology” .................................................................... 366
B. Choosing Genes/Choosing Kin: “Reprogenetic”
Families ....................................................................... 371
C. Families of Shared DNA.............................................. 380
D. The “Medicalized Family” .......................................... 389
Conclusion ......................................................................... 396
I. INTRODUCTION

The form of family prized during the middle of the twentieth
century is disappearing. Many commentators – in universities, 1 in
courts, 2 in the media, 3 and in private settings 4 – have noted the
* Jack and Freda Distinguished Professor of Health Care Law, Hofstra Law School. B.A., Barnard
College (philosophy); M.A. and Ph.D., Princeton University (anthropology); J.D., Yale Law School.
I am grateful to Toni Aiello, Reference Librarian, Hofstra Law School, for her insightful assistance;
to participants in law faculty workshops at Case Western Reserve University and at Seton Hall
University for helpful comments; and to Hofstra Law School for research support.
1. See, e.g., JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1994); Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the
Presumption of Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U.L. REV. 227 (2006).
2. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63-64 (2000) (plurality opinion) (noting major
demographic changes in the “average American family”).
3. Joan Biskrupic, Same-Sex Couples Redefining Family Law in USA, USA TODAY, Feb. 18,
2003, at 1A (considering options open to gay and lesbians parents and prospective parents);
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increasing importance of autonomous individuality and choice to
understandings of families in the U.S. For almost a half century, society
and the law have increasingly viewed family members – especially
adults within families – as autonomous individuals, free to forge their
own bargains within family settings. In consequence, families shaped by
individuals’ nontraditional choices are now commonplace. 5
Yet, even as society has committed itself to autonomous choice in
shaping family relationships, it has seemingly become more obsessed
with the biological (and especially the genetic) correlates of family.
Moreover, a variety of views about biology’s role in defining families
has appeared. 6 For some, understandings of DNA are assimilated to
traditional understandings of “flesh and blood.”
For others,
understandings of DNA follow from a commitment to choice.
Prospective parents, for instance, spend significant sums of money to
gain access to donor gametes that they imagine will give them children
with certain traits and interests. 7 In still other cases, courts and
legislatures have displaced the traditional presumption that a mother’s
husband is the father of her children through reference to the “facts” of
DNA. 8 Elsewhere, “families” are being mapped through online searches
for “donor relatives.” And in yet other contexts, families are being
defined in light of genetic alterations that predispose family members to
medical conditions. 9
Tension resulting from a host of discrepant understandings of
Whatever Happened to the Nuclear Family? 2000 Census Report on Families, FOOD PROCESSING,
Aug. 1, 2001; May 20, 2001, Sunday 4 STAR EDITION; Genaro C. Armas, Living Together Out of
Wedlock on the Rise – Even in Bible Belt, THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE, May 20, 2001, at A24
(reporting increased incidence of nonmarital cohabitation even in Bible Belt states).
4. Karin Cook, Early Admissions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007, §14, at 11 (satire commenting
on attractiveness of nontraditional families of choice to private preschool selection committees and
thus suggesting popular interest in families of choice); Gargi Chakrabarty, Changes in Home
Designs Reflect Shifts in Lifestyles, THE INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Nov. 7, 2001, at 01C (noting that
according to 1999 survey one-third of new homes in U.S. are purchased by nontraditional families).
5. See, e.g., MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 35-36
(1993) (noting increasing reliance on “contract” in family settings); NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
CHILDREN, FINAL REPORT: BEYOND RHETORIC: A NEW AMERICAN AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND
FAMILIES 15 (1991) (describing “social, demographic, and economic changes” in U.S. families in
previous 30 years).
6. Ken M. Gatter, Genetic Information and the Importance of Context, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
423, 427 (2003) (noting that many people accept the view of some geneticists about “the power of
genetics and its predominance in describing who and what we are”). The specific geneticist to
whom Gatter refers in the passage is Francis Crick. Along with James Watson, Crick described the
double-helix structure of DNA in the 1950s. Id.
7. See infra notes 179 - 185 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 187 - 203 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 236 - 270 and accompanying text.
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family is transparent in the law and in society. A culture committed to
autonomous choice in defining the scope of family relationships and
gripped by suppositions about the centrality of presumed biological facts
to the definition of families will, of necessity, be forced to mediate
between promises of unending choice and claims about biology (and
DNA, more particularly) as a source of personal and familial fate. As
society and the law have attempted to mediate such conflicting views of
family, a host of new forms of family has emerged.
Even more, along with the waning of the traditional family, the
ideology 10 that undergirded that construct – one that assumed a social
unit distinct in purpose and design from the industrial marketplace – has
crumbled. Yet, many of its elements (its “values” and “social anchors”)
have survived. To these elements others, once shunned in the domain of
home and family, have been added. Thus, autonomy (including choice
and agency), biology (read as “flesh and blood” and as DNA), love,
intention, commitment, and bargain are variously invoked as society
attempts to understand families. Efforts to define and regulate families
are rendered more complicated still insofar as any one of these values or
anchors (e.g., intention, loyalty, choice, love, bargain, “blood,” or genes)
can, depending on context or whim, be combined with any one or more
of the others. And any one may predominate over, or be subordinate to,
any of the others in efforts to define families. The result is uncertainty.
That uncertainty has, in turn, engendered continuing, often vociferous
debate about the contours of family relationships.
Much has been written about the role of choice in constructing the
“modern” family. This Article assumes the significance of choice and
proceeds to examine the shifting uses of biology in the social
construction of family. 11
10. This essay uses the term “ideology” to refer to a set of pervasive, underlying social beliefs
in terms of which people think about and act in the world. This use of the term follows that of the
French anthropologist Louis Dumont:
Our definition of ideology thus rests on a distinction that is not a distinction of matter but
one of point of view. We do not take as ideological what is left out when everything
true, rational or scientific has been preempted. We take everything that is socially
thought, believed, acted upon, on the assumption that it is a living whole, the
interrelatedness and interdependence of whose parts would be blocked out by the a priori
introduction of our current dichotomies.
LOUIS DUMONT, FROM MANDEVILLE TO MARX: THE GENESIS AND TRIUMPH OF ECONOMIC
IDEOLOGY 22 (1977).
11. See, e.g., BRUCE J. SCHULMAN, THE SEVENTIES: THE GREAT SHIFT IN AMERICAN
CULTURE, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS (2001); ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE
AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000); BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE
CULTURE: RETHINKING OUR COMMITMENTS TO MARRIAGE AND FAMILY (1997); MILTON C.
REGAN, JR., FAMILY LIFE AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY (1993).
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The next Part of the Article (Part II) provides a brief overview of
the ideology in terms of which society understood the family during the
nineteenth, and most of the twentieth, century. Part III then summarizes
the increasing readiness of society and of lawmakers since the 1960s,
openly to premise delimitations of family on values once associated with
the marketplace, but not the home. Parts II and III provide background
to Part IV.
Part IV, the heart of the Article, focuses on contemporary
understandings of family that preserve a central role for the biological
correlates of domestic relationships. The Part describes four social
responses to the widespread presumption that biology (now generally,
though not always, read as “DNA”) is significant to understandings of
family in light of society’s commitment to autonomous choice in family
settings.
The first of these responses reflects an understanding of family –
referred to here as the “flesh and blood” family – that harmonizes most
closely with understandings of the traditional family. Terms such as
“blood” and “flesh and blood” – the presumed truths in terms of which
traditional families were constructed – may be replaced with terms such
as “DNA” and “genes.” These terms may then serve as modern
synonyms for “blood” or “flesh and blood.”
The second response is encapsulated by what is here referred to as
the “reprogenetic” family. In this form of family, a notion of DNA as an
object of reproductive choice and a notion of DNA as fate compete with
each other. Of the four forms of family considered in Part IV, the
reprogenetic family most closely resembles contemporary families of
choice.
The phrase “families of shared DNA” is used to describe a third
response to the collapse of the traditional family that preserves a central
role for presumptive biological facts. This notion of family imbues
genes with the power to encompass both tradition and choice. Part IV
describes two distinct sub-types of such families. The first is a product
of recent legislative and judicial decisions that reshape the so-called
marital presumption. 12 The second sub-type depends on the significance
attributed to shared DNA among so-called “donor relatives.” This
second sub-type generally involves “donor siblings” (children conceived
from the sperm of one man but not connected to each other through
social history or interaction until one party identifies another, usually

12. See infra notes 187 - 203 and accompanying text (exploring parameters of the “marital
presumptions”).
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through an internet search). It may also include “donor fathers.” In
theory, a similar analysis could be entertained concerning egg donation.
However, for a variety of reasons, children are far less often conceived
through donated eggs than through donated sperm. In part, this seems a
simple consequence of the far more exacting burden involved in
donating eggs than in donating sperm. It may also reflect a peculiar
expansion of differences that reflect more generalized perceptions of
gender. 13
Finally, Part IV considers a fourth distinct form of family that
depends centrally on presumptive biological (genetic) facts. This form
of family (referred to here as a “medicalized family”) is remarkable in
that it largely precludes choice while safeguarding individualism. It
suggests a novel and potentially troubling notion of family.
Each of these four forms of family is anchored to presumptive
truths about biology. In this, each resembles the “traditional” family.
But the difference between the four forms of family reviewed in this
Article and the traditional family is as significant as is the similarity just
noted. In particular, the nexus that once connected presumed truths
about biology to expected modes of conduct among members of
traditional families has been rent asunder. Various truths about biology
co-exist with various expectations about behavior within the forms of
family reviewed in this Article. No longer, however, do presumptions
about either the biological or the social order clearly indicate the shape
of presumptions about the other.
II. THE “TRADITIONAL” FAMILY
This Part briefly describes the “traditional family” as a cultural
construct. 14 It aims to depict mainstream visions of family from the
early years of the Industrial Revolution to the middle of the twentieth
century. Yet, it recognizes that from a social perspective, interactions
within so-called traditional families varied significantly depending on a
wide set of economic, geographical, ethnic, and psychological factors. 15

13. See Kristin Spilker & Merete Lie, Gender and Bioethics Intertwined: Egg Donation
within the Context of Equal Opportunities, 14 EUR. J. OF WOMEN’S STUD. 327, 327-28 (2007)
(noting more controversial debate about ethics of egg donation than of sperm donation).
14. This part is thus not concerned with the actual variety of family forms during the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries or with the practices through which family relationships were
actualized in particular families. There were of course significant differences in families that
correlated with geography, class, and national origin, among other things.
15. See STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE
NOSTALGIA TRAP 14 (1992).
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The material in this Part is intended to provide a comparative frame for
considering the forms of family considered in Part III, and especially, in
Part IV.
During most of U.S. history, families were widely viewed as social
units, grounded in “blood relationships” 16 and in set patterns of familial
conduct. Traditional families valued hierarchy and reflected fixed roles
and statuses. 17 Many family relationships were viewed as resulting from
and reflecting what were understood as objective facts of nature. 18 In
short, within traditional families, people were expected to follow clearly
defined patterns of behavior, structured with reference to the hierarchical
organization of family statuses. 19
The traditional form of family, forged in the early years of the
Industrial Revolution, was defined in almost express contrast to the
nineteenth – and twentieth – century marketplace. In the marketplace,
autonomous individuals were expected to arrange and re-arrange their
own bargains. At home, family relationships were defined in light of
clear roles, themselves shaped through reference to hierarchically
organized statuses. Further, it was assumed that people at work were
motivated by money, entered into relationships they understood as
transient, and functioned as autonomous individuals. In contrast, society
assumed that people at home were motivated by love, that family
relationships were enduring, and that autonomous choice had a very
limited role in shaping relationships among family members. 20
16. Visions of family in the U.S. have always included a place for kinship relations not
grounded on a presumed biological connection. The spousal connection is the paradigmatic
example. David M. Schneider, Kinship, Nationality, and Religion in American Culture: Toward a
Definition of Kinship 65 (1969), reprinted in SYMBOLIC ANTHROPOLOGY: A READER IN THE STUDY
OF SYMBOLS AND MEANINGS (Janet L. Dolgin, David S. Kemnitzer, & David M. Schneider eds.,
1977) [hereinafter Schneider, Kinship, Nationality, and Religion] (noting that people “related by
marriage are not related ‘in nature’”). In this regard, people related “in-law” – a term suggesting the
relationship’s grounding, id. – include spouses, step-children and parents-in-law, and other relatives
connected through a family member’s spouse (and, more recently through a family member’s
significant other).
17. These families are referred to in this Article as “traditional” families.
18. The term “biological relatedness” is taken from David M. Schneider, who studied the
cultural components of American families during the middle of the twentieth century. Schneider,
Kinship, Nationality, and Religion, supra note 16, at 63. See also id. at 65; DAVID M. SCHNEIDER,
AMERICAN KINSHIP: A CULTURAL ACCOUNT (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter SCHNEIDER, AMERICAN
KINSHIP]. Not all family relationships, of course, were presumed to have been grounded in “blood.”
In addition to relations through “blood,” people were understood as related through marriage
(“law,” as in “in-laws”). See id. at 37.
19. SCHNEIDER, AMERICAN KINSHIP, supra note 18, at 29. These statuses were generally
based on differences in age and gender.
20. Schneider described the family at mid-twentieth century as a social unit of “enduring
diffuse solidarity.” SCHNEIDER, AMERICAN KINSHIP, supra note 18, at 53.
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The separation of home and market was an ideological and practical
construct that reflected a shift from the colonial world, in which family,
community, and work were not sharply differentiated. 21 With the
development of the industrial marketplace of the nineteenth century, and
the social chaos that that development engendered, understandings of
home (social myths, 22 if you will) presumed a universe of home and
family that offered sanctuary from the demands of the ever-changing
market. 23
The anthropologist David Schneider studied the American family
during the middle of the twentieth century, just before American society
self-consciously redesigned the scope and meaning of family
relationships (at least between adults). 24
Broadly, Schneider’s
interviewees assumed a family “consisting of husband, wife, and their
children who live together as a natural unit. The family is formed
according to the laws of nature and it lives by rules which are regarded
by Americans as self-evidently natural.” 25
Schneider’s interviewees further described families in terms of a
status system based largely on differences in age and gender. 26
Schneider reported that his interviewees understood authority in families
to belong to fathers. 27 They justified that allotment of power through
reference to fathers’ gender, age, and putatively greater experience. 28 In
sharp contrast, they explained that women in families were expected to
“bear children, nurse them, and care for them.” 29
Finally, and most important, the universe of the traditional family
was understood by those whom Schneider interviewed as absolutely
different from the world of work. 30 “[W]ork and home,” Schneider
concluded, “are different in [almost] every significant way.” 31 More
specifically, explained Schneider:

21. JOHN DEMOS, PAST, PRESENT AND PERSONAL: THE FAMILY AND THE LIFE COURSE IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 28 (1986).
22. The term “myth” is here used in the sense intended by the French structuralist, Roland
Barthes. Barthes defined “myth” as a “system of communication,” a “message.” ROLAND
BARTHES, MYTHOLOGIES 109 (Annette Lavers, trans., Noonday Press 1972) (1957).
23. See STEVEN MINTZ & SUSAN KELLOGG, DOMESTIC REVOLUTIONS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 52-60 (1988).
24. SCHNEIDER, AMERICAN KINSHIP, supra note 18.
25. Id. at 34.
26. Id. at 35.
27. Id. at 36.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 35.
30. Id. at 46.
31. Id.
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The set of features which distinguishes home and work is one
expression of the general paradigm for how kinship relations should be
conducted and to what end.
These features form a closely
interconnected cluster.
The contrast between love and money in American culture
summarizes the cluster of distinctive features. Money is material, it is
power, it is impersonal and unqualified by consideration of sentiment
or morality. Relations of work, centering on money, are of a
temporary, transitory sort. They are contingent, depending entirely on
the specific goal – money.
....
. . . [T]he opposition between money and love is not simply that
money is material and love is not. . . . [L]ove is spiritual. The spiritual
quality of love is closely linked with the fact that in love it is personal
considerations which are the crucial ones. Personal considerations are
a question of who it is, not of how well they perform their task or how
32
efficient they are.

Thus, understandings of the traditional family presumed a world of
home that was prized – and broadly, shaped – by its differences from the
commercial marketplace.
At home, people largely rejected the central values of the
Enlightenment and of the capitalist marketplace – equality, autonomy,
individualism, and the right to individual choice. At home, people
valued hierarchy, fixed roles, and community. 33 The ideological
dynamic around which society understood this construction was shaped
through reference to assumed differences between “blood,” understood
as a fact of nature, and bargain (a mode of interaction associated with the
commercial marketplace). More important, the biological and social
parameters of family were linked. Each set of parameters reflected
society’s understanding of the other.
III. NEW FORMS OF FAMILY: THE PREDOMINANCE OF AUTONOMOUS
INDIVIDUALITY
Commitment to that vision of family dimmed in the last decades of
the twentieth century. 34 Increasingly, society rejected many of the
32. Id. at 48-49.
33. Id. at 34-35.
34. See SCHULMAN, supra note 11, at 16 (describing the decade of the 1970s generally as one
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values that had sustained the so-called traditional family. 35 Even more,
society replaced those values with values that predominated in the
marketplace. 36
In consequence, alternative modes of family
relationships began openly to compete with those associated with
traditional families. Family members, and especially adults within
families, began to envision their familial lives as they understood their
lives in the marketplace – through the presumptions of autonomous
individuality. 37 The transformation of family was not of course only a
matter of ideological change. As Justice Sandra Day O’Connor noted at
the turn of the twenty-first century: 38 “The demographic changes of the
past century make it difficult to speak of an average American family.” 39
A. Choice and Intention: As Between Adults in Families
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, American law had begun to
facilitate a world of family governed by choice and intention. A social
world that focused on individual rights began to displace a world that
defined family behavior through reference to “natural” truth. 40
that “reshaped the political landscape. . . . In race relations, religion, family life, politics, and
popular culture, the 1970s marked the most significant watershed of modern U.S. history, the
beginning of our own time”).
35. Id. at 16-17.
36. Id. at xii.
37. Id. at 16.
38. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (finding Washington state’s nonparental visitation
statute unconstitutional as applied to the mother in the case).
39. Id. at 63-64 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted). Stephanie Coontz compared the
demographics of American families of 1950 with those of 1990:
Ninety percent of all the households in the country were families in the 1950s, in
comparison with only 71 percent by 1990. Eight-six percent of all children lived in twoparent homes in 1950, as opposed to just 72 percent in 1990. And the percentage living
with both biological parents – rather than, say, a parent and stepparent – was
dramatically higher than it had been at the turn of the century or is today: seventy
percent in 1950, compared with only 50 percent in 1990.
STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE REALLY ARE: COMING TO TERMS WITH AMERICA’S CHANGING
FAMILIES 37 (1997).
40. See William E. Nelson, Patriarchy or Equality: Family Values or Individuality, 70 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 435, 524 (1996) (noting appearance of “new values” in family law in decades after
World War II). Nelson further explains that:
[T]he new values were cast in the language of rights which their bearers could enjoy
without assuming any corresponding duties or responsibilities. When these new ideas
about rights became attached to older assumptions about normal and natural male
behavior, the social advantages men had customarily enjoyed became reified into formal
legal privileges standing apart from the social obligations with which traditional morality
had encumbered them. As a result, men gained increased legal power, and women lost
significant legal protections.
Id.
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Lawmakers affected a number of concrete changes in the regulation of
family life. In particular, they acknowledged the significance of
individual rights in domestic settings. In the last few decades of the
twentieth century, states began, for instance – slowly at first and then
with widespread determination – to validate prenuptial agreements in
contemplation of divorce, 41 to enforce cohabitation agreements, 42 and to
provide for divorce without accusations of fault. 43 Since then, a few
states have provided civil union options for same-gender couples
anxious to marry or have recognized same-gender marriage. 44 Each of
these developments reflects the increasing significance of autonomous
choice to society’s understandings of family relationships among adults.
B. Choice and Intention: Constructing the Parent-Child Relationship
The law has been more hesitant to welcome choice in shaping
family matters that directly affect children. Only rarely have courts
acknowledged children’s full autonomy in family settings. 45 Moreover,
courts continue to exercise parens patriae authority over children and
will thus invoke children’s “best interests,” in refusing to effect
provisions in agreements between parents that specify custody
arrangements for children should the parents separate or divorce. 46 Yet,
41. See, e.g., Posner v. Posner, 233 So.2d 381, 384 (Fla. 1970) (upholding prenuptial
agreement). The Posner court took judicial notice of the increase in the proportion of divorces of
marriages in society and noted that prenuptial agreements had previously been broadly viewed as
invalid violations of a public policy favoring marriage. Id. at 383.
42. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 114-16 (Cal. 1976) (upholding agreement
between non-marital partners and noting that sexual services cannot provide consideration for such
agreements); Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1154-57 (N.Y. 1980) (upholding express
agreements between domestic partners but refusing to uphold implied agreements).
43. William Nelson concluded, in his fascinating study of New York family law between
1920 and 1980, that in the state “[t]he most decisive shift from law based on traditional family
values to law emphasizing individual rights and happiness occurred as the New York courts,
beginning in the late 1930's, slowly retreated from the state's century-old policy of keeping marriage
indissoluble.” Nelson, supra note 40, at 498.
44. Vermont, for instance, provides for civil unions, VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207
(2007), and Massachusetts allows same-gender couples to marry, Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003).
45. Exceptions exist, but they are rare. See, e.g., Gregory K. v. Ralph K., No. CI92-5127,
1992 WL 551488 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 20, 1992). The trial court granted standing to 11-year old
Gregory to challenge his biological mother’s maternity. Id.
46. Vivian Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 31, 42 n.49
(2006) (agreements between parents that provide for custody of children are not binding) (citing
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 7.08 (2002)); Carolyn Eaton Taylor, Note,
Making Parents Behave: The Conditioning of Child Support and Visitation Rights, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1059, 1069-70 (1984) (noting that judges can redefine agreements between parents about
custody or support if the agreements “are not in the child’s best interest” or if they are “patently
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with regard to the creation of the parent-child bond, especially in
contexts that have involved assisted reproduction, courts have expressly
displaced presumptive biological links and have predicated family
relationships on parental choice. Moreover, judges have recognized
novel understandings of the parent-child unit as a result of having
previously recognized new forms of familial relationships among
adults. 47
A string of California cases involving disputes about the contours
of maternity provides a textbook illustration of the move from biology to
intention as the key determinant of legal parentage. 48 These cases reflect
a deep commitment to choice, but they also reflect concern with the
biological correlates of family relationships and with safeguarding
traditional forms of family relationships. Thus, they provide an
important bridge to the discussion that follows (in Part IV) concerning
social efforts to mediate the gap between presumptions that undergird a
commitment to choice in defining families and presumptions that
undergird a commitment to biological “facts” in defining families.
In 1993, in Johnson v. Calvert, 49 California’s highest court
considered a parentage dispute between a married couple, Crispina and
Mark Calvert, and Anna Johnson, who gestated and gave birth to a child
conceived from the Calverts’ gametes. The three had previously entered
into a surrogacy agreement that provided for the Calverts to pay Johnson
$10,000 and for Anna to relinquish “all parental rights” to the Calverts at
the baby’s birth. 50
All three California courts that heard the case held for the Calverts,
but on different grounds. Judge Parslow, for the trial court, based the
Calverts’ parentage on their genetic connection to the child. 51 The
appellate court, relying on a set of provisions in state law that provided

unfair”).
47. See infra notes 72 – 100 and accompanying text.
48. This shift has not been as definitively accepted with regard to other sorts of parentage
disputes.
49. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
50. Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr 369 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), aff’d sub nom. Johnson v.
Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 206 (1993). In addition to the $10,000,
which the contract specified the Calverts were to pay to Johnson in installments, the Calverts agreed
to purchase a $200,000 life insurance policy on Johnson’s life. Id. at 372.
51. Johnson v. Calvert, No. X-633190, slip op. at 5 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Oct. 22,
1990), aff’d sub nom. Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). Trial court
judge, Judge Parslow, explained: “In this case we have a family unit, all genetically related. You
have Mark Calvert, Crispina Calvert and their child they call Christopher; three people in a family
unit.” Id. at 10.
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for the identification of parentage through DNA testing, affirmed. 52 The
state’s highest court agreed that the Calverts were baby Christopher’s
parents but rejected both the trial court’s invocation of biology (genes)
and the appellate court’s reliance on state statutory law. 53 Rather, the
state supreme court concluded that, in cases such as this one, involving
two women with cognizable claims to biological maternity, maternity
follows from parental intention. 54 The court explained:
We conclude that although the Act recognizes both genetic
consanguinity and giving birth as means of establishing a mother and
child relationship, when the two means do not coincide in one woman,
she who intended to procreate the child—that is, she who intended to
bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own—
is the natural mother under California law. 55

In a footnote, the court made it clear that its rule did not ensure the
maternity of the ovum donor in all cases: “Thus, under our analysis, in a
true ‘egg donation’ situation, where a woman gestates and gives birth to
a child formed from the egg of another woman with the intent to raise
the child as her own, the birth mother is the natural mother under
California law.” 56 Indeed, soon after Johnson was decided, a New York
court relied on this footnote to denominate an intentional mother who
gestated twin girls conceived from her husband’s sperm and the ova of a
donor as the legal mother of the children. 57

52. Anna J., 286 Cal. Rptr. at 373-74 (citing CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7000-7021 (West 2008)
repealed 1994)). The Court relied largely on the Uniform Parentage Act, adopted in California in
1975 as Part 7 of Division of the California Civil Code.
53. The biological frame employed by the trial court failed to account for Anna Johnson’s
biological role as the woman who gestated and gave birth to the baby. Moreover, the state statutory
scheme was constructed before the advent of gestational surrogacy. Other provisions in California’s
statutory law would have resulted in Anna (the woman who gave birth to the child) being declared
its legal mother. The Uniform Parentage Act, on which the appellate court relied in finding that
Anna was the baby’s mother, also provided that a child’s birth mother is that child’s mother.
Johnson, 851 P.2d at 781.
54. Id. at 782.
55. Id. While not expressly enforcing the agreement into which the parties had entered, the
court relied on that instrument for evidence of the parties’ intentions. Id.
56. Id. at 782 n.10.
57. McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (N.Y. 1994). The court concluded:
In the case at bar, we have a true ‘egg donation’ situation, and we find the reasoning of
the Supreme Court of California on this issue to be persuasive. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court, Queens County, correctly held that in the instant ‘egg donation’ case,
the wife, who is the gestational mother, is the natural mother of the children, and is,
under the circumstances, entitled to temporary custody of the children with visitation to
the husband.
Id. at 480 (quoting Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782) (citation and footnote omitted).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol41/iss2/2

12

Dolgin: Biological Evaluations
DOLGIN_FINAL

2008]

3/23/2009 2:51 PM

BIOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS

359

After Johnson, a California appellate court entertained a so-called
traditional surrogacy case, in In re Moschetta. 58 In this case, the
surrogate enjoyed a relationship of full biological maternity with the
child. 59 The intending mother (Cynthia) had no biological link with the
child. 60 The case was not, however, occasioned by a dispute between
these two women. 61 Rather it was initiated by Robert Moschetta, the
genetic and intending father. 62 Soon after the birth of the baby involved,
the Moschettas entered into divorce proceedings. 63 Robert (but not
Cynthia) wanted Cynthia to be named the mother of the child,
presumably so that he would not have to share parentage with the
surrogate, Elvira Jordan. 64 The court, concluding that the surrogate, not
Cynthia, was the child’s legal mother, noted that there was “no question
about biological parenthood to settle.” 65 Elvira was the child’s
biological mother. 66 Cynthia had no biological connection to the child.
Thus, Moschetta seemed clearly to establish that intentional maternity,
as defined in Johnson, only applies to cases in which the intentional
mother has some biological relation (genetic or gestational) to the child
involved.
Then, in 1998, in Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 67 a California appellate
court reexamined the question in the context of reproductive facts that
were more complicated than those at issue in Moschetta. In Buzzanca,
the court relied on Johnson’s intent analysis to grant maternity to a
woman, Luanne Buzzanca, who had no biological relation to the child
she claimed as her own. 68 Luanne (the intending mother) had neither a
gestational nor a genetic relationship with the baby involved; those
functions had in fact been split between two women – a gestational
surrogate and an anonymous ovum donor.69 Thus, an argument could be

58. In re Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr.2d 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
59. Id. at 895.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 895-96.
65. Id. at 897 (emphasis omitted).
66. Id. at 895.
67. In re Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr.2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
68. Id. at 282.
69. John and Luanne Buzzanca believed that the egg used to conceive the baby was donated
anonymously. In fact, the egg may have been one of those “stolen” from an infertility patient by the
doctors running the University of California-Irvine clinic where the child involved was conceived.
See 48 Hours: The Family Tree: Child Born to In-vitro Fertilization May Have Been Created From
Stolen Embryo (CBS television broadcast May 14, 1998).
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made that the reproductive facts of Buzzanca resembled those at issue in
Johnson more than those at issue in Moschetta. The Buzzanca court’s
analysis expanded Johnson’s applicability to a woman who was not
connected biologically to the child for whom she was named as the legal
mother.
Then, in 2005, California’s highest court elaborated on the
implications of the Johnson intent model of parentage. 70 More
specifically, the court provided for a broader set of tests (based in part on
life choices) that allowed a woman to be recognized as a child’s parent
even in a case in which the intent test delineated in Johnson would have
led to a different result. 71
In three companion cases 72 proclaiming that a child can have “two
parents both of whom are women,” 73 California’s supreme court
concluded that application of the intent test to “break a tie” is not
necessary in a case involving only two potential parents (regardless of
the gender of each), 74 that “natural” parentage does not necessarily mean
“biological” parentage, 75 and accordingly, that a woman with no
biological or adoptive relation to a child may be deemed that child’s
“natural” mother if she intends to raise that child and presents herself to
others as the child’s “natural” mother. 76
In these cases, the court expressly rejected a series of assumptions
that had been basic to understandings of family only a couple of decades
earlier. In particular, in Elisa B., 77 the court re-interpreted its conclusion
in Johnson that a child could have “only one natural mother.” 78 The
court provided for two “natural” mothers because, explained Justice
Moreno, the case involved only two prospective parents (rather than
three, as in Johnson). 79 “We perceive no reason,” the court concluded in

70. See K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 681-82 (Cal. 2005).
71. Id.; supra note 55 and accompanying text.
72. Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 117 P.3d 690, 692 (Cal. 2005) (precluding mother from challenging
a stipulated judgment by which she and her lesbian partner agreed to share the parentage of a child
that Kristine H. was expecting); K.M., 117 P.3d at 675 (holding that genetic mother was also legal
mother of twin girls born to her lesbian partner, who gave birth to the children); Elisa B. v. Superior
Court, 117 P.3d 660, 669 (Cal. 2005) (holding non-biological mother to be mother of children born
to her lesbian partner because the non-biological mother participated in conception of children,
received them into her home, and held them out as her children).
73. Kristine H., 117 P.3d at 696.
74. K.M., 117 P.3d at 681.
75. Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 670.
76. Id. at 668-70.
77. Id. at 662.
78. Id. at 665 (quoting Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781 (Cal. 1993)).
79. Id. at 665-66.
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Elisa B., “why both parents of a child cannot be women.” 80
Even more, the court in Elisa B. recognized Elisa B.’s maternity,
not because she had expressly entered into an agreement with her
partner, Emily B., to co-parent, but on the basis of life choices. 81 More
particularly, the court did not recognize Elisa B.’s maternity on the basis
of a biological link to the children involved. Elisa B. claimed no
biological link to the children. 82 Rather, the court found that Elisa B.
was a mother because she had “actively assisted Emily in becoming
pregnant.” 83 Moreover, noted the court, Elisa intended to enjoy the
rights and to accept the responsibilities of parenthood. 84 Also, she had
“received the children into her home and openly held them out to the
world as her natural children.” 85
More particularly, in the set of cases of which Elisa B. is one, the
California court provided for two women to be denominated mothers of
a child (or children), even if one of the women would likely have been
denied maternal rights under Johnson’s intent test. In particular, the
court in K.M. v. E.G. named K.M., the genetic mother of twin girls, born
to her lesbian partner, as the children’s second parent. 86 Judge Moreno
explained that the court did not premise that conclusion on the Johnson
intent test because there was “no ‘tie’ to break.” 87 In Johnson, the
California Supreme Court had predicated its intent analysis on the need
to break a “tie” between two women with claims to biological
maternity. 88 K.M. did not claim maternity at the expense of E.G.’s
maternity. Rather, she claimed her own maternity “in addition to”
E.G.’s maternity. 89 Thus, unable easily to rely on the intent test, the
80. Id. at 666. The decision seems to leave standing the assumption that children can have
two, but no more than two, legal parents.
81. The court supported its holding through reference to section 7611(d) of the Uniform
Parentage Act which expressly provides that a man is presumed to be a child’s father if he “receives
the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child.” Id. at 667. The court
noted further that “the legal principles concerning the presumed father apply equally to a woman
seeking presumed mother status.” Id. (quoting In re Salvador M., 111 Cal. App.4th 1353, 1357
(Cal. Ct. App. 2003)).
82. Id. at 663.
83. Id. at 669.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 670.
86. K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 681 (Cal. 2005).
87. Id.
88. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781 (Cal. 1993).
89. K.M., 117 P.3d at 681. The court explained:
Unlike in Johnson, their parental claims are not mutually exclusive. K.M. acknowledges
that E.G. is the twins’ mother. K.M. does not claim to be the twins’ mother instead of
E.G., but in addition to E.G., so we need not consider their intent in order to decide
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state supreme court in K.M. displaced examination of the parties’ preconception intentions with a more general examination of the parties’
choices, including, in particular K.M.’s decision to participate together
with E.G. in the conception of a child or children. 90 Had the case been
resolved through reference to the Johnson “intent” test, K.M. would
likely not have been named a parent because, in signing an ovum
donation form that provided for her surrendering any maternal rights she
might have had, she expressly denied that she was an “intending” parent.
In fact, a reading of the facts of K.M. v. E.G. in light of the intent test
outlined in Johnson, led both the trial court and the intermediate
appellate court to reject K.M.’s claim to maternity. 91
After these cases, the law in California – and the state is not alone
in this 92 – no longer consistently assumes that identification of legal
parentage should conform to presumptive biological truths or to social
forms associated with traditional understandings of the family. Rather,
parentage can be predicated on choices. Such choices may be made
known through a declaration of intentions or in written agreements, or
they may become clear through one’s actually raising a child in one’s
home and treating that child as one’s own before a larger community. 93
Another case – one decided in Pennsylvania in 2007 – suggests the
far-reaching consequences for children of new forms of familial
relationships among adults. In Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, a Pennsylvania
appellate court concluded that children can have three legal parents. 94
The court allotted parental responsibility to support two children 95 as
between them.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
90. Id. at 682.
91. Id. at 677 (“The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, ruling that K.M. did not qualify
as a parent ‘because substantial evidence supports the trial courts factual finding that only E.G.
intended to bring about the birth of a child whom she intended to raise as her own.’” (emphasis
omitted)). The state supreme court decision replaces an interpretation of “intention” that looks to
provisions in a contract or contract-like document with one that looks to acts suggesting parties’
states of mind.
92. See, e.g., In re Roberto D.B., 2007 Md. LEXIS 269, 285 (Md., May 16, 2007), rev’g 814
A.2d 570 (2003) (allowing name of gestational surrogate to be omitted from the birth certificate of a
child conceived as the result of an agreement between the father and the surrogate); McDonald v.
McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477, 477 (N.Y. 1994) (relying on Johnson’s intent test to name an
intending, gestational, but not genetic, mother as a legal mother); Developments in the Law: IV.
Changing Realities of Parenthood: The Law’s Response to the Evolving American Family and
Emerging Reproductive Technologies, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2052, 2074 (2003) (states have
“expand[ed] the notions of ‘parents’ and ‘family’”).
93. See supra notes 72 and 85 and accompanying text.
94. Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473, 482 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
95. The biological mother was given primary custody. Her former lover was given partial
custody, and the biological father was given visitation rights. Jacob, 923 A.2d at 476. Two other
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well as custodial responsibilities for them, among a biological mother,
her former lesbian lover, identified by the court as enjoying in loco
parentis status, 96 and the sperm donor. The latter had maintained a
relationship with, and provided some support to, the children, thus
indicating, in the court’s view, his “intention to demonstrate parental
involvement far beyond the merely biological.” 97 Yet, this man objected
to a support obligation. 98
The court seemed unconcerned with the enormity of the
implications of its decision for the shape of families, or at least it seemed
self-consciously to elide those implications:
In the trial court’s view the interjection of a third person in the
traditional support scenario would create an untenable situation, never
having been anticipated by Pennsylvania law. We are not convinced
that the calculus of support arrangements cannot be reformulated, for
instance, applying to the guidelines amount set for Appellant [the
biological mother’s ex-partner] fractional shares to incorporate the
contribution of another obligee. 99

Thus, in Shultz-Jacob, a decision that upends a fundamental assumption
about parentage is laid out as if it involved nothing more complicated
than dividing a child’s support needs among three, instead of between
two, adults. 100
Such unorthodox family relationships are largely grounded in
increased judicial deference to adults’ autonomous choices about family
matters. That deference has shifted the parameters and meaning of
parentage. In short, the law is more and more often openly reshaping
family relationships that were perceived, but a quarter century ago, as
grounded in the very nature of things. 101
Yet, at the same time, as the forms of family considered in the
following Part suggest, society and the law seem increasingly compelled

children were involved in the case but were not the biological children of the sperm donor. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 481.
98. The biological mother, Jodilynn Jacob, had not pursued support claims against Carl
Frampton, the biological father. Id. at 479.
99. Id. at 482.
100. The decision clearly provides for three parents. However, the fact that the biological
father died of a stroke shortly before the decision was rendered may have eased the court’s concern
about actual relationships among the parties involved. See Reggie Sheffield, Sperm Donor Must
Pay Child Support, THE PATRIOT-NEWS, May 10, 2007.
101. This paper is concerned with the ideology of kinship. Thus, concern is with relationships
that people view as biological (not with the scientific facts, as it were, pertinent to genetic, or other
sorts of biological, relationships).
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by the putative significance of biological “facts” to the construction of
family relationships.
IV. PERCEPTIONS OF BLOOD AND PERCEPTIONS OF GENES: “NEW
FAMILIES FOR OLD” 102
And so, as courts, reflecting society, have been crafting a
jurisprudence of family that has buttressed nontraditional families-ofchoice, society is simultaneously lured by the notion that biology – and
especially DNA – is an essential component of personal and group
identity. 103 Even as there is more room for choice in shaping family
relationships, there is more room for biology (now more often than not
referred to as “genes” or “DNA”).
A similar peculiarity was noted by the British anthropologist,
Marilyn Strathern, though with a more general set of referents. 104
Strathern describes a society increasingly obsessed at once with the
effort to be both more modern and more traditional:
[I]t would seem we cannot be at both ends of the continuum at the
same time. I want to suggest that is exactly where we might be. The
suggestion arises from an otherwise perplexing sensation. This is the
sense that there seems both more ‘status’ and more ‘contract’ around in
the world, or at least in arguments about them. Would it also follow
then that one might have both more tradition and more modernity at
the same time? 105

Thus, Strathern observes a new set of options: just as people may prefer
tradition to modernity, so they may prefer modernity to tradition. 106
Such options and the inevitable interplay that develops among them are,

102. I am indebted to Professor Marilyn Strathern for the heading of Part IV. See, e.g.,
Marilyn Strathern, Surrogates and Substitutes: New Practices for Old?, in JAMES GOOD & IRVING
VELODY, THE POLITICS OF POSTMODERNITY (1998); Marilyn Strathern, New Families for Old?, in
THE FAMILY IN THE AGE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY (Carole Ulanowsky ed., 1995).
103. Mary R. Anderlik & Mark A. Rothstein, The Genetics Revolution: Conflicts, Challenges
and Conundra: DNA Based Identity Testing and the Future of the Family: A Research Agenda, 28
AM. J. L. & MED. 215, 216 (2002) (considering importance of the Human Genome Project (HGP),
federal welfare policy, the fathers' rights movement and media interest in domestic drama” to
increased interest in DNA-testing to provide information about identity, especially in family
contexts).
104. Marilyn Strathern, Enabling Identity? Biology, Choice and the New Reproductive
Technologies, in QUESTIONS OF CULTURAL IDENTITY 37, 45 (Stuart Hall & Paul Du Gay eds.,
1996).
105. Id.
106. Id.
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as Strathern suggests, “perplexing.” 107
Shaping and identifying family relations becomes ever the more
perplexing in a world in which a person or a group’s genome is
understood at least in some part to limit and direct that person or group’s
physical characteristics, talents, medical future, and even perhaps
anxieties, amusements, and daydreams. 108 Dorothy Nelkin and M.
Susan Lindee describe the centrality of the notion of DNA to
contemporary understandings of personhood:
Just as the Christian soul has provided an archetypal concept through
which to understand the person and continuity of self, so DNA appears
in popular culture as a soul-like entity, a holy and immortal relic, a
forbidden territory. The similarity between the powers of DNA and
those of the Christian soul, we suggest, is more than linguistic or
metaphorical. DNA has taken on the social and cultural functions of
the soul. It is the essential entity – the location of the true self – in the
narratives of biological determinism. 109

That view of DNA presents an unnerving set of options within a society
that already has “both more tradition and more modernity at the same
time.” 110
This Part considers four distinct understandings of contemporary
family. Each of the four resembles each of the others in placing
particular significance on some presumed biological parameter of
family. In that, these understandings of family differ from those
reviewed in Part III. Yet, each form of family considered in this Part
differs from the other three. Most important, this Part suggests that
alongside society’s increasing attention to autonomous choice in
constructing families, there sits a vision (or more accurately a set of
visions) of family in terms of which biology, in one guise or another,
continues to play a central role.

107. Id.
108. See Gatter, supra note 6, at 427 (considering genetic exceptionalism). Gatter writes:
“‘You,’ your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal
identity and free will, are in fact no more than the [genetically determined] behavior of a vast
assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules.” Id. (quoting FRANCIS CRICK, THE
ASTONISHING HYPOTHESIS: THE SCIENTIFIC SEARCH FOR THE SOUL 3 (1994)).
109. DOROTHY NELKIN & M. SUSAN LINDEE, THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE GENE AS A
CULTURAL ICON 41-42 (1995). This is not, of course, a claim about the scientific significance of
genomes to people’s behavioral or physical development. It is rather about popular social views of
the significance of genomes to people’s lives.
110. Strathern, supra note 104, at 45.
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A. “Flesh and Blood” Families: “DNA” Substitutes for “Biology”
Sometimes, the terms “DNA” or “genes” serve as substitutes for the
terms “blood” or “flesh and blood.” This substitution can preserve – or,
more likely, appear to preserve – traditional understandings of family in
an age in which a variety of dramatically new visions of family abound.
1. Changing Labels: Preserving Traditional Forms of Family?
A recent newspaper account about tensions that attend family
celebrations at holiday time comments:
The first Christmas present you ever received was your genetic
inheritance . . . .
Who we are, our bodies, our physical and psychological quirks, our
habitual sayings, and our way of speaking [about] them are all
intimately bound up with our family.
Those endless mantras at family occasions – ‘Doesn’t Keith look
like George?’; ‘Helen’s so like mother’ – are lessons in genetic
biology.
Insofar as we have complicated feelings about ourselves, our
appearance, our characters, we will in turn have complicated feelings
about those with whom we share a lot of these things, namely our own
111
flesh and blood.

Here the family is described variously as a unit of “flesh and blood” and
as a unit of shared genes. Both references suggest a shared substance in
terms of which family relationships may be shaped, bemoaned, or
celebrated. The social meaning of this shared substance (whether named
“DNA” or “flesh and blood”) seems quite like that described by David
Schneider in his study of American kinship in the middle of the
twentieth century:
A blood relationship is a relationship of identity. People who are
blood relatives share a common identity, they believe. This is
expressed as ‘being of the same flesh and blood.’ It is a belief in
common biological constitution, and aspects like temperament, build,

111. A.N. Wilson, Relative Values, DAILY MAIL (LONDON), Dec. 28, 2006, at 14. The account
describes a celebration in Britain. It is possible to rely on this description because there is a unified
set of “knowledge practices” among “modernist” Euro-Americans that result in similar
understandings of kinship in the U.S. and in Britain. See Strathern, supra note 104, at 48-49.
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physiognomy, and habits are noted as signs of this shared biological
makeup, this special identity of relatives with each other. Children are
said to look like their parents, or to “take after” one or another parent
or grandparent; these are confirming signs of the common biological
identity. 112

Additionally, Schneider explained that “[w]hen a person is related to a
blood relative he is related first by common biogenetic heredity, a
natural substance, and second, by a relationship, a pattern for
behavior.” 113
2. Embedding Choice in Tradition
Yet, even as the notion of genes is offered as a synonym for
“blood” in popular discourse about family relationships and is thus used
to confirm relationships that seem to facilitate traditional forms of
familial behavior, developments in biotechnology allow the selection of
genes and promise the manipulation of DNA. 114 Assisted reproduction
now allows prospective parents to conceive a child outside a woman’s
body, to freeze gametes for later use, and to select among embryos and
among gamete donors and surrogate mothers.
However, people who create families using such nontraditional
reproductive methods seem often to expect that those families, once
created, will follow traditional patterns of familial interaction.
Prospective parents who rely on gamete donors or on gestational
surrogates, or who select against certain embryos or in favor of others
seem often to presume that the families that result from their
reproductive and reprogenetic choices will, once created, mirror
traditional families in becoming units of enduring community, much like
the families that David Schneider described in the middle of the
twentieth century.
Some court cases occasioned by assisted reproduction reflect
parties’ insistence on choice in modes of reproduction, but also reflect
continuing focus on biological links as familial anchors and further
reflect concern for safeguarding tradition in family relationships. So, for
instance, the intending parents in Baby M., 115 a New Jersey case
112. SCHNEIDER, AMERICAN KINSHIP, supra note 18, at 25.
113. Id. at 26.
114. See, e.g., Sheryl Lawrence, Comment, What Would You Do With a Fluorescent Green
Pig?: How Novel Transgenic Products Reveal Flaws in the Foundational Assumptions for the
Regulation of Biotechnology, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 201, 209 (2007) (describing aspect of gene
manipulation).
115. In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
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occasioned by a traditional surrogacy arrangement gone awry,
proclaimed the value of traditional family patterns. In fact, they justified
reliance on surrogacy by describing its capacity to create stable,
traditional families. 116
Elizabeth Stern (the intending mother) and her husband, William
Stern (the intending and genetic father) had entered into an agreement
with Mary Beth Whitehead. 117 Whitehead agreed to gestate a child,
conceived with William Stern’s sperm (introduced into Whitehead’s
body through assisted insemination) and at the child’s birth, to surrender
the child and parental rights to the Sterns. 118 Whitehead became
pregnant, as planned, and gave birth in March 1986 to a girl (referred to
by the courts as Baby M.). 119 After the baby’s birth, Whitehead changed
her mind about surrendering the child. 120 A custody and parentage
dispute between Whitehead and the Sterns ensued. 121 In presenting their
case to the New Jersey courts, the Sterns asserted that traditional
families can be shaped by effecting prospective parents’ contractual
choices. 122 They explained that old-fashioned families can be created
through nontraditional choices:
Through surrogate parenthood, traditional family values are
strengthened. In seeking to create a traditional family structure in the
only way available to the commissioning couple, surrogate
motherhood insures that the couple who has invested both considerable
time and money in the surrogacy process will be dearly dedicated to
the child. A surrogate motherhood arrangement actually increases the
overall number of family units within society. 123

Ironically, while contending that the absence of a biological link
between Elizabeth Stern and the child was not significant, the couple
explained that they had chosen surrogacy over adoption so as to preserve
William Stern’s genetic heritage. 124 Thus, it would seem, they
understood biological links as important, but not as essential, to the
development of what they hoped would be a traditional parent-child
bond.

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

See infra notes 117 and 123.
Baby M., 537 A.2d at 1235.
Id.
Id. at 1236.
Id. at 1236-37.
Id. at 1237.
Brief on Behalf of Respondent at 99-106, In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
Id.
Baby M., 537 A.2d at 1235.
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In the decade following Baby M., reproductive options increased
rapidly. 125 As a result, some prospective parents have taken on heavy
financial and emotional burdens in order to have children connected to
them genetically. Some have openly stated that they have relied on
reproductive technology in order to construct families that reflect
traditional assumptions about kin. 126 In the early 1990s, Rochelle
Dreyfus and Dorothy Nelkin reported:
Media articles on reproductive technologies imply that women should
reproduce at all costs for they will be emotionally “desperate” without
their own children. Those unable to conceive seek out surrogate
mothers in order to have genetically related children. Films and
articles on parent-child relationships suggest the importance of genetic
integrity, of “flesh and blood.” Genealogy services are flourishing as
people pursue their roots. “How to” books and articles written for
adoptees stress the importance of finding one’s natural or birth parents
and suggest that knowing one’s genetic heritage is a way to define
identity. The very concept of identity is defined more in biological
127
than in social terms.

As Dreyfus and Nelkin report, prospective parents are willing to
rely on expensive and nontraditional forms of assisted reproduction in
order to have children they can view as their “flesh and blood.” 128 They
rely on assisted reproduction so that they will have traditional
families. 129 They presume, it would seem, that a biological (genetic)
link between parent and child grounds the relationship in something real
– “flesh and blood” – and thus provides an anchor around which to
create loving relationships, intended to endure.
And so, such
prospective parents seem often to assume, or at least to hope, that their
125. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 776 (Cal. 1993) (resolving a dispute
occasioned by a gestational surrogacy arrangement).
126. An additional motive for intending parents to select gestational over traditional surrogacy
is the increased likelihood of safeguarding their legal parentage should a dispute develop between
them and the surrogate. See, e.g., Deborah H. Wald, The Parentage Puzzle: The Interplay Between
Genetics, Procreative Intent, and Parental Conduct In Determining Legal Parentage, 15 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 379, 385 (2007).
127. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Dorothy Nelkin, The Jurisprudence of Genetics, 45
VAND. L. REV. 313, 319-20 (1992).
128. Id. at 319.
129. See generally In re Baby M., 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1987), aff’d in part and
rev’d in part, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). Mary Beth Whitehead, the surrogate, argued that
surrogacy should be prohibited because it is unnatural. Brief on Behalf of Mary Beth and Richard
Whitehead at 34-55, In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). In contrast, William and Elizabeth
Stern, the intending parents, argued that a surrogacy arrangement may be necessary for the creation
of a family, but in no way precludes that family, once created, from reflecting traditional modes of
family life. Brief on Behalf of Respondent at 99-106, In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
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family – apart from its mode of creation – will follow the pattern of
traditional families of the sort described by David Schneider four
decades ago. 130
In such cases, parental choices, stemming from perceptions about
the significance of DNA, appear to signal parental hope (or a less selfconscious assumption) that genetic ties identify and fortify familial
relationships. More particularly, prospective parents who continue with
expensive and emotionally draining infertility care month after month131
in order to have a child genetically related to them (or to one of them)
seem to envision genes as a fit foundation on which to construct familial
relationships. Even in an age in which parental intentions may trump
genetics in courts of law, 132 parents involved in custody or parentage
disputes invoke genetic links between themselves and the children
involved as strong evidence that the children will be best served by their
biological parents being named as legal parents.
In presenting their case for parentage in Johnson v. Calvert – in
which California’s highest court concluded that parental intentions
determined legal parentage 133 – Mark and Crispina Calvert described
their genetic relationship to baby Christopher as strong support for the
development of a satisfying parent-child relationship. An expert for the
Calverts 134 (ultimately declared the legal parents of the child gestated by
Anna Johnson, despite Johnson’s post-conception change of mind and
interest in becoming the child’s legal mother) 135 argued that “the
strongest parental connection to a child is through his genetic factors.”136
The Calverts further declared:
We tend to take for granted such frequent comments as: “She talks just
like her father,” or “he has his mother’s blue eyes,” etc. Those are the
reflections of our identity, our inherited traits, intellect and history. . . .
. . . . Indeed, genetics determine our identity. The right to continued
130. See SCHNEIDER, AMERICAN KINSHIP, supra note 18. See also supra notes 113 - 114 and
accompanying text; supra notes 125 - 129 and accompanying text (describing prospective parents’
hopes for families being created through nontraditional means).
131. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS
DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 229 (2006).
132. See supra notes 49 - 57 and accompanying text (considering Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d
776, 776 (Cal. 1993) and McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (N.Y. 1994)).
133. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782. See also supra notes 49 - 56 and accompanying text.
134. Johnson, 851 P.2d 776. This case, as noted in Part III, supra, reflects a commitment to
intention and a concern with preserving biological connection. Id.
135. See supra notes 51 - 55 and accompanying text.
136. Respondents’ Brief at 17, Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)
(citing Dr. Justice Call, witness for Respondents).
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common relationship with progeny and the reciprocal relationship
simply cannot be denied. 137

These claims – made in the context of a case in which the state’s
highest court ultimately identified the Calverts as parents because of
their preconception intentions – suggest the magnitude of the confusions
and complexities engendered by society’s simultaneous commitment to
choice and its fixation with DNA.
In short, the presumption that both autonomous choice and the
preservation of tradition can be central to the construction of a family
suggests a contradiction at the center of society’s view of family. In the
short term, that contradiction can be bridged by bracketing the creation
of families from the actualization of social relationships within families,
and then presuming that each activity can be shaped and understood in
isolation from the other. The fragility of that effort is transparent.
B. Choosing Genes/Choosing Kin: “Reprogenetic” Families
The cases and situations considered in this Section involve
prospective parents self-consciously relying on reprogenetics 138 in order
to have a certain kind of child. 139 This contrasts with those reviewed in
the previous Section in that the focus shifts from DNA as a key
determinant of family connections to DNA as a key determinant of an
The “reprogenetic family” is
individual child’s personhood. 140
described here as an ideal type. It can, in practice, merge with other
forms of family. Thus, this Section considers the far-reaching
implications of creating families through reprogenetic choices. As the
previous Section suggests, those who create families in this way can, in
practice, aim to develop more traditional forms of family that stress
communal solidarity rather than autonomous individuality and choice.
However, this Section also considers the possibility that choosing
prospective children’s gametes and gestators will commodify the
children who are born as a result of such choices, and will displace
137. Id. at 49.
138. Lori Knowles and Gregory Kaebnick define “reprogenetics” (short for reproductive
genetics) to “include[ ] all interventions involved in the creation, use, manipulation, or storage of
gametes and embryos.” REPROGENETICS, LAW, POLICY, AND ETHICAL ISSUES ix (Lori P. Knowles
& Gregory E. Kaebnick, eds., 2007) [hereinafter REPROGENETICS].
139. Suzanne Holland, Market Transactions in Reprogenetics: A Case for Regulation, in
REPROGENETICS: LAW, POLICY, AND ETHICAL ISSUES 96 (Lori P. Knowles & Gregory E.
Kawbnick, eds. 2007) (comparing “older forms of IVF” with reprogenetics).
140. The difference between cases considered in this Section and those reviewed in the
previous Section is not absolute. It is, rather, a matter of perspective and cultural stress.
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parents as teachers and guides with DNA as the measure of conduct.
For over a century, 141 prospective parents (and/or their physicians)
have selected sperm donors, 142 thus engaging in an early form of
“reprogenetics.” Since the last decades of the twentieth century,
pregnant women have routinely been offered prenatal screening and the
opportunity to abort “defective” fetuses. 143 Moreover, sophisticated new
modes of genetic selection provide unprecedented opportunities for
prospective parents to make choices about their future children’s
genomes. 144 Each of these possibilities encourages prospective parents
to focus on choices about DNA as they engage in the reproductive
process.
But choices about DNA cannot, once made, be reshaped. 145 From
the vantage point of prospective parents seeking to select a future child’s
genome, DNA may represent choice and freedom. Yet, from the
vantage point of the genetically chosen child, genes (the very same
genes, as it were) may be viewed as depriving the child of futures he or
she may view as preferable to those presumptively offered to him or her
by preconception or pre-birth parental choices. Yet, the limits of choice

141. John Hunter, a British physician who worked in the late eighteenth century, is credited
with having been the first to rely on assisted insemination to help an infertile patient become
pregnant. DAVID PLOTZ, THE GENIUS FACTORY: THE CURIOUS HISTORY OF THE NOBEL PRIZE
SPERM BANK 163 (2006). Between then and the 1920s or 1930s, the practice was relied on only
rarely. Beginning in the 1930s, physicians in Britain and the U.S. more often (though quietly, at
first) offered assisted insemination to infertile patients. Id. at 165.
142. Of course, in selecting spouses and other sexual partners, people have always been able,
as it were, to make choices about the genetics of their future offspring.
143. Gilbert Meilaender, Designing Our Descendants, in THE FUTURE IS NOW: AMERICA
CONFRONTS THE NEW GENETICS 83-84 (William Kristol & Eric Cohen eds., 2002).
144. These techniques include sperm sorting, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, and genetic
changes to sperm or eggs. REPROGENETICS, supra note 138, at ix. Preimplantation genetic
diagnosis (PGD) has been used primarily by prospective parents anxious to select a specific
deleterious genetic alteration such as that associated with Tay-Sachs disease, cystic fibrosis, or
Duchenne muscular dystrophy. Maxwell J. Mehlman, The Law of Above Averages: Leveling the
New Genetic Enhancement Playing Field, 85 IOWA L. REV. 517, 526-27 (2000).
[PGD] requires fertilization of the egg in the laboratory, that is, in vitro fertilization
(“IVF”). The fertilized egg is permitted to grow to an eight to twelve cell mass at which
point a cell is removed for analysis. This cell removal does not injure the embryo. The
single cell can then be analyzed to determine if there are any genetic abnormalities.
Typically during IVF, approximately ten to twelve embryos are created. Using PGD on
several of the embryos permits a determination of which embryos are “affected” and
which are not. One or more embryos without the genetic condition would be transferred
to the uterus in hopes of initiating a pregnancy.
Jeffrey R. Botkin, Genes and Disability: Defining Health and the Goals of Medicine: Prenatal
Diagnosis and the Selection of Children, 30 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 265, 280-81 (2003).
145. At some time in the future, it may be possible, through genetic engineering, routinely to
alter genomes of individuals.
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notwithstanding, prospective parents increasingly entertain choices that
reflect a society captivated by the lure of DNA.
1. Prenatal Genetic Tests
An increasingly familiar and sophisticated set of tests provides for
more and more knowledge about the chromosomes and genes of
gametes, embryos, and fetuses. 146 Prospective parents can rely on postconception testing followed by abortion or on preimplantation genetic
diagnosis, followed by selection of embryos to provide for the birth of a
child who will (or will not) have or be likely to have a particular set of
traits. 147
Such practices seem clearly to harmonize with a society that views
family members (in this case prospective parents) as autonomous
individuals, free to welcome or reject particular embryos or fetuses as
they contemplate potential children. This new “eugenics,” in the words
of the Christian theologian and bioethicist Gilbert Meilaender, “comes
embedded in the language of privacy and choice.” 148 On that ground,
recent reprogenetic choices have been differentiated from eugenic
policies that have depended on coercion resulting from decisions
reached by the state. 149
146. Sonia Mateu Suter, The Routinization of Prenatal Testing, 28 AM. J.L. MED. 233, 234-43
(2002) (describing history and routinization of genetic testing).
147. Prospective parents may, for instance, decide not to implant an embryo, or they may
choose to abort a fetus that testing shows will suffer from a serious illness or disability (e.g., TaySachs disease). Others may seek a child that manifests a particular genetic trait or set of traits. For
instance, deaf parents, anxious to have a child who could most easily fit into the social world of deaf
people, might screen for deafness and select against an embryo or abort a fetus that would not be
deaf. See Andrew Grubb, Regulating Reprogenetics in the United Kingdom, in REPROGENETICS:
LAW, POLICY, AND ETHICAL ISSUES 144, 155 (Lori P. Knowles & Gregory E. Kaebnick, eds.,
2007). In 1996, and again six years later, two deaf lesbians, anxious to have children together,
sought the sperm of a man who was deaf and whose ancestors had exhibited deafness for several
generations. Each time, the couple had a child who was born deaf. Note, Regulating Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: The Pathologization Problem, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2770, 2782
(2005) (citing Margarette Driscoll, Why We Chose Deafness for Our Children, SUNDAY TIMES
(London), Apr. 14, 2002, at 7).
Other parents might select for a child that will be a suitable donor for an existing, sick
child (suffering, for instance, from a genetic condition) while, at the same time, selecting against an
embryo that will carry the genetic alteration associated with the condition in question. Grubb,
supra, at 155-56.
148. Meilaender, supra note 143, at 83. Meilaender sees the “new eugenics” to remove
government “from what is seen as entirely a private choice.” Id.
149. See Mary B. Mahowald, Aren’t We All Eugenicists?: Commentary on Paul Lombardo’s
“Taking Eugenics Seriously,” 30 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 219 (2003). Mahowald distinguishes between
acceptable and unacceptable forms of eugenic practice through reference to a wide variety of factors
(e.g., state coercion versus autonomous choice; practices aimed at ending lives versus practices

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008

27

Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 2, Art. 2
DOLGIN_FINAL

374

3/23/2009 2:51 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[41:347

But even in the modern context that, to echo Meilaender, 150 prizes
privacy and choice, children born as a result of parental choices about
DNA are not free to welcome or reject those choices. This raises
significant moral concern, 151 and may spur social efforts to mediate the
apparent contradiction inherent in a commitment to choices that preclude
future choice. 152
aimed at supporting lives). Id.
The horrifying character of the Nazi eugenics effort is described in Matthew Lippman,
War Crimes Prosecutions of Nazi Health Professionals and the Contemporary Protection of Human
Rights, 21 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 11, 17-19 (1995).
Before World War II, the Eugenics Record Office (ERO) (on Long Island in New York)
actively fostered eugenics policies. Paul A. Lombardo, Taking Eugenics Seriously: Three
Generations of ??? Are Enough?, 30 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 191, 203 (2003). Charles Davenport,
Director of the ERO, proposed studying families to identify those likely to produce “great men” and
those likely to produce “insane and feeble-minded” people as well as those suffering from a wide
host of perceived disabilities. Id. at 202-03. The ERO proposed “government coercion” in order to
“sanitize[]” the population. Id. at 205.
150. Meilaender, supra note 143, at 83.
151. Theorists associated with the disability rights critique have criticized prenatal testing
followed by embryo selection or abortion as based on an “unfortunate, often misinformed decision
that a disabled child will not fulfill what most people seek in child rearing. . . .” Erik Parens &
Adrienne Asch, Special Supplement: The Disability Rights Critique of Prenatal Testing: Reflections
and Recommendations, 29 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT S1, S2 (1999). Other theorists have worried
that “genetic technology” may be used for evil rather than for good – that “boundless [genetic]
freedom” could become “boundless destruction.” PAUL RAMSEY, FABRICATED MAN: THE ETHICS
OF GENETIC CONTROL (1970), as reprinted in THE FUTURE IS NOW: AMERICA CONFRONTS THE
NEW GENETICS 41, 46 (William Kristol & Eric Cohen eds., 2002). That worry is based in concern
that society may go too far in upsetting the “natural” course of events – so far, that we “undermin[e]
our humanity.” Gertrude Himmelfarb, Two Cheers (Or Maybe Just One) for Progress, in THE
FUTURE IS NOW: AMERICA CONFRONTS THE NEW GENETICS 73, 75 (William Kristol & Eric Cohen
eds., 2002).
In addition, parental choices about the shape of future children’s genomes result from
larger socio-cultural and economic forces. Such choices stem from and reflect a set of shifting
cultural assumptions about what an ideal child should be. Moreover, the medical profession, which
plays a significant role in mediating such reproductive choices for prospective parents, is broadly
committed to using the technological instruments that provide more and more information, thereby
augmenting the illusion of endless reproductive choice. In addition, choices about a future child’s
genome are not predictive in the straightforward manner that prospective parents may assume.
Some genetic decisions are more likely to be predictive than others. Selecting against embryos with
genetic alterations associated with Tay-Sachs, for instance, will preclude the birth of children who
will suffer from that condition. But the presumption that the gametes of a tall sperm donor or a
smart egg donor will result in tall or smart children is far less certain. See Maxwell J. Mehlman,
The Law of Above Averages: Leveling the New Genetic Enhancement Playing Field, 85 IOWA L.
REV. 517, 527-28 (2000).
152. The conflict between parental choice and children’s consequent lack of choice (their
genetic fate, as it were) can be considered in light of and compared to the wide assortment of cases
in which society acknowledges that one person’s liberty may interfere in some way with another
person’s choices, or more particularly, to cases in which parental choices about how to raise
children limit children’s options. Efforts to mediate between the right to choose, and the
consequences of choosing, someone else’s DNA, if considered seriously, may falter precisely
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Yet, American lawmakers – in contrast with those in Canada,
Australia, and most countries in Europe 153 – have generally not
prohibited and have not consistently regulated the use of reproductive
technology, including reprogenetics. 154 And so, prospective parents
increasingly rely on ultrasound and amniocentesis, often followed by
abortion if the results of such tests are seen as disappointing, 155 and on
preimplantation genetic diagnosis, often followed by embryo selection,
aimed at selecting against disease or even aimed at selecting for (or
against, depending on one’s perspective) various traits, including, most
often, gender. 156
2. Choosing Sperm, Ova, and Embryos and Choosing Those Who
Supply Them
Other sorts of choices aimed at selecting a future child’s DNA are
being made by prospective parents who spend large sums of money for
infertility care. 157 The high cost of such care, even compared with the
cost of adoption which can also be expensive, 158 sometimes suggests the
because choices about DNA can be viewed as more momentous than a person’s right to annoy a
neighbor (by, say, owning a pet despite a neighbor’s fear of animals or by painting one’s house with
colors that offend neighbors’ aesthetic sensibilities or sense of priority), or than a parent’s right to
make choices about a child’s religious affiliation, elementary school education, or diet.
153. Richard F. Storrow, The Bioethics of Prospective Parenthood: In Pursuit of the Proper
Standard for Gatekeeping in Infertility Clinics, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2283, 2291 (2007) (comparing
regulation of fertility industry in U.S. and elsewhere); Debora Spar, Business and Medicine:
Reproductive Tourism and the Regulatory Map, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 531, 532 (2005) (reporting
that women come to the U.S. in order to obtain donor ova); Richard F. Storrow, Quests for
Conception: Fertility Tourists, Globalization and Feminist Legal Theory, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 295,
304 (2005); Ian Fisher, Italian Vote to Ease Fertility Law Fails for Want of Voters, N.Y. TIMES,
June 13, 2005 (reporting on regulation of reproductive technology and reprogenetics in Italy).
154. There are no federal laws regulating parental reliance on prenatal genetic testing. See,
e.g., Bratislav Stankovic, “It's a Designer Baby!”: Opinions on Regulation of Preimplantation
Genetic Diagnosis, 2005 UCLA J.L. TECH. 3, 4 (2005); Lindsey A. Vacco, Comment, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: From Preventing Genetic Disease to Customizing Children. Can
the Technology Be Regulated Based on the Parents’ Intent?, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1181, 1200
(2005). A number of states regulate research on embryos. Louisiana’s law, which defines
“embryos” as “juridical persons” is the most limiting among these. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129
(2004). See also Stankovic, supra, at 6 (noting other state laws regulating embryo research). Vacco
reports that in contrast with the absence of regulation in the U.S., PGD is prohibited in Austria,
Germany, Ireland, and Switzerland, and is regulated in France, Spain, Sweden, and Britain. Vacco,
supra.
155. SPAR, supra note 131, at 111.
156. Id. at 99.
157. Debra Spar reports that the cost of a baby conceived in vitro is between $69,000 and
$85,000 for a young woman and between $151,000 and $223,000 for an older mother. Id. at 229.
158. Some couples rely on donated gametes rather than adoption because the woman desires to
experience pregnancy. See LISA STOWLE CAHILL, THEOLOGICAL BIOETHICS: PARTICIPATION,
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interest of many prospective parents 159 in having genetic ties to their
children 160 or in choosing their children’s genomes. 161 The second sort
of interest may arise in cases in which infertility patients, lacking viable
sperm or ova, rely on the opportunity that may be offered by an
infertility clinic to select among gamete and embryo donors. 162
A market for eggs appeared in the U.S. at the end of the twentieth
century. 163 Recipients have often been quite specific about their
preferences. Those seeking gametes are now paying tens of thousands
of dollars for the eggs of Ivy League, and other, donors presumed to be
supplying “superior” genes. 164
Sperm are cheaper and more easily obtained than ova, and a market
in sperm has existed for many decades. 165 Particularly in the U.S.,
sperm banks market their products to end-consumers rather than to
physicians 166 and now reveal significant information about donors from
among whose sperm consumers may choose. Sperm banks routinely
provide clients with information about a donor’s family history, food
tastes, hobbies, 167 and I.Q. 168 Prospective parents not only make choices
among those offered, but they are willing to pay more for sperm from
donors described as having particular traits. They often pay more, for
instance, for sperm from a tall man than from a short man. 169
There is a peculiar tension between the interest of prospective
parents in having children to whom they will have a genetic link and in
having children by using what they perceive or hope to be gametes
carrying desirable genes, 170 though both interests suggest the continuing
JUSTICE, AND CHANGE 197 (2005).
159. SPAR, supra note 131, at 178, 179, 183.
160. See supra notes 126 - 138 and accompanying text (noting prospective parents’ interest in
safeguarding genetic heritage).
161. Conceiving children with the use of donor eggs is likely to cost at least $50,000 and
sometimes much more than that. SPAR, supra note 131, at xii. Contracting with a surrogate mother
is likely to cost about $59,000 (2004). Id. at xi. In 2004, revenue from infertility care in the U.S.
was over $2 billion. Id. at 3. See also Holland, supra note 139, at 88, 99.
162. Ova alone can cost as much as $50,000 (2004). SPAR, supra note 131, at xi.
163. See id. at 45. In 1991, a former actress advertized for the eggs of young actresses and
then sold the ova of her recruits at high prices to an “upscale clientele, couples who were picky
about their eggs.” Id.
164. See id. at 99.
165. See id. at 35 (noting opening of first for-profit sperm bank in the 1970s in Minnesota).
Nonprofit sperm banks existed before that time. Id.
166. See id. at 37.
167. See id. at 39.
168. See PLOTZ, supra note 141.
169. See id. at 102.
170. Sometimes, of course, a prospective parent or parents may seek to have a child that is
genetically linked to one parent and whose other set of chromosomes comes from a putatively
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attraction of biology in shaping families. Some prospective parents,
relying on donated gametes to reproduce, have sought donors with traits
that resemble their own. Others have sought what they imagined would
be superior gametes by seeking gamete donors with particular traits or
personal successes. Sometimes the two interests appear to merge. For
instance, a spokesperson for a couple that offered $50,000 for the ova of
a tall, smart woman explained, as if it were the most self-evident of
matters, that the husband and wife were themselves tall and smart and
therefore desired tall, smart children. 171
A much smaller, less remunerative market in embryos supplements
that in eggs and sperm. Embryos are rarely created with the aim of
donation in mind. Rather, almost all embryos available for transfer were
created in the context of infertility care, 172 and then frozen, but not
wanted for use by the progenitors. 173 The market in embryos is too new
and too small to provide potential recipients with far-reaching choices.
But markets in gametes, both ova and sperm, suggest what David Plotz
The phrase announces the
refers to as Darwinian auctions. 174
superior donor. See PLOTZ, supra note 141 (describing in detail views and concerns of parents and
their donor-conceived children about the sperm donation process and sperm donors).
171. See Talkback Live (CNN television broadcast Mar. 12, 1999) [hereinafter Talkback Live]
(reporting statement by lawyer of couple who placed advertisements in elite university newspapers
seeking ova from students with SAT scores of at least 1400 and at least 5' 10" tall). See also Irene
Sege, A $50,000 Dilemma on Campus, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 6, 1999, at A1.
The couple’s lawyer, interviewed on CNN, explained that the couple, themselves tall and
smart, preferred to have a child who would resemble his or her parents, but added unhesitatingly
that the couple (perhaps thinking of the happenstance in DNA), would love a short, dumb child.
“Let me point out,” he maintained, “this child will be loved, no matter if it’s short, tall, smart or not
so smart.” Talkback Live, supra. The lawyer’s statement dramatically illustrates the contours of
the social effort to amalgamate marketplace tactics with family values.
172. See SPAR, supra note 131, at 88-89.
173. A small market in such excess embryos was stimulated by the efforts of a Christian
adoption agency to avoid the destruction of embryos produced in the context of infertility care. The
agency generally matches Christian donors and recipients. Id. at 89-90. Recipients agree, before
getting embryos, that they will not abort or selectively reduce a pregnancy for any reason. Susan L.
Crockin, Embryo Wars: How Do You ‘Adopt’ a Frozen Egg?, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 4, 2005, at
D12. Crockin, a Boston lawyer specializing in reproductive technology, reports that less than 2% of
people who create embryos agree to donate unused embryos to other couples. Id. She suggests as
well that “abandoned” embryos are more likely than other embryos to have tested positive for
deleterious genetic alterations. Id.
Spar reported in 2006 that embryo donees paid $5,500 as an agency fee, and another
$3,000 to $4,000 for medical care. SPAR, supra note 131, at 90.
Unlike almost all of the cases considered in this Section, the work of this agency aims to
short circuit modernity and to create the most traditional sort of families through use of donated
embryos.
174. PLOTZ, supra note 141, at 202. Writing, in particular, about prospective parents seeking
donated eggs, Plotz describes “[m]iddle-aged couples –acting more like Darwinian auctioneers than
aspiring parents . . . .” Id.
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troublesome excesses of reproductive choice.
Society’s commitment to reprogenetic choice threatens to
subordinate biology to choice (when, for instance, prospective parents
are able to offer huge sums of money for gametes from donors with
certain physical traits and achievements). But at the same time, it
threatens to subordinate choice to biology (when, for instance, the
resulting child is not what the parents bargained for or when the
resulting child later resents choices made about his or her DNA).
In his book about the so-called “Nobel prize sperm bank,” David
Plotz wonders whether the commodification of sperm will inevitably
result in the commodification of the children conceived through use of
donor sperm. 175 Plotz worries that the more the market in sperm, replete
with customers, advertisements, and competition, 176 resembles other
markets, the more the process will encourage prospective parents to
imagine prospective children as commodities; the more they will view
the reproductive process as one views selecting among commodities in
the marketplace; and the more they will think it reasonable to respond to
the children who result as one responds to satisfying or unsatisfying
merchandise. 177
From this perspective, the possibility of choosing one’s children’s
gametes from a catalogue harmonizes with a social ideology that prizes
individualism and choice. The practice is discomforting to many
because it challenges the notion that parents do, or at least should, love
their children regardless of their genetic endowments. 178 The situations
considered in the next subsection magnify this concern.
3. Designer Babies 179
A marketplace in sperm, ova, and embryos may seem moderately
serene – even old-fashioned – when compared with prospective parents
relying on genetic engineering and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis

175. Id. at 181.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Others express concern about the cultural forces that shape presumptive reproductive
choices or that some people’s reproductive choices will prove harmful to the larger social whole.
See CAHILL, supra note 158, at 204-05.
179. At present, opportunity to produce “designer babies” is limited. See, e.g., Staff
Background
Paper,
Human
Genetic
Enhancement
(Dec.
2002),
available
at
http://www.bioethics.gov/background/humangenetic.html (noting that “[w]hile we are currently a
long way from the ability to produce ‘designer babies,’ techniques are currently available to make
possible some forms of somatic genetic enhancement”).
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(PGD) to shape a future child’s genome. 180 Selecting gametes and
embryos can at least arguably be viewed as an extension of a more
traditional approach to selecting one’s child’s other parent. Genetic
engineering and PGD provide the technological backbone for the
production of what have come to be referred to as “designer babies.” 181
Critics of PGD have predicted that the practice will lead to “individual,
consumer eugenics,” allowing people with adequate resources to select
their future children’s traits from a catalogue of possibilities. 182 The
notion of “designer children” challenges society’s commitment to
autonomous choice with images of prospective parents shaping their
future children’s DNA in light of personal whim and shifting social
trends.
In her book about the economics of infertility care, Deborah Spar
predicts that an existing market in designer babies will grow. 183 Morals
or price may discourage some people from entering this market, but
others, Spar predicts, will “want to choose, paying not only for a baby
but also for the genetic probability of a particular kind of kid.” 184
A serious instability can be found at the center of families defined
through one generation’s autonomous (self-conscious) choices about
another generation’s DNA. Perhaps most troubling, the locus of familial
responsibility may shift away from parents as guides and role models
toward DNA as the presumed arbiter of social behavior. Efforts to
categorize parental choices about a future child’s DNA with choices
about health care, athletic training, or singing lessons 185 will likely prove
misguided. Such efforts presume that the commodification of children,
lurking at the edge of choices about their DNA, will not seriously
undermine the ongoing structure of family life. That presumption may
well prove to be a misapprehension.

180. Stankovic, supra note 154. See also supra notes 146 - 156 and accompanying text.
181. A background paper, written for the President’s Council on Bioethics, notes the difference
between genetic screening and “directed genetic change.” The second involves the effort to “make
heritable changes in the genes of human cells.” THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, STAFF
BACKGROUND
PAPER:
HUMAN
GENETIC
ENHANCEMENT
(2002),
http://www.bioethics.gov/background/humangenetic.html. Gene therapy, the background paper
further notes, has “produced positive results for a few diseases.” Id.
182. Stankovic, supra note 154, at 4.
183. SPAR, supra note 131, at 100. In 2006, Spar reported the existence of more than fifty
clinics offering PGD as part of reproductive care, and that “[m]any of the more recent ‘patients’ at
these clinics . . . do not suffer from infertility or carry potentially devastating genes.” Id. Rather,
they opt for PGD “to get the kind of baby they want.” Id.
184. See id. at 100.
185. Rhonda Shaw, Life in a Petri-Dish: Procreative Liberty, Choice, and the Governance of
Women’s Bodies, 32.2 HECATE 141, 147 (2006).
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Choices about the genetic composition and construction of
“designer babies” entail a self-conscious effort to “design” another
person: that effort limits that other person’s choices. Within families
that define themselves through reference to autonomous choice about
children’s genes, the actualization of one party’s genetic choices about
another’s DNA presents a contradiction unlikely easily to be bridged.
That is especially so if, as seems probable, family members view each
other primarily as autonomous individuals rather than as embedded in a
structured, communal whole.
C. Families of Shared DNA
This Section describes a third response to the collapse of the
ideology that supported traditional families. It resembles those already
described in this Part in that it depends centrally on assumptions about
the biological parameters of family. This third response, like the others
described here, pays homage to the presumed significance of biological
facts. It reflects a commitment to DNA as the ultimate decisor of
personhood.
In “families of shared DNA,” genetic links displace tradition and
ultimately challenge choice. Yet, more often than not it seems, the selfconscious effort to create enduring familial ties to “kin” connected only
through DNA is unsuccessful. 186 For instance, searches for kin, carried
out by children conceived from the sperm of anonymous donors, do
encourage participants to focus on genetic identity. But that focus seems
to facilitate a form of individualism dependent on a notion of self-asDNA rather than to facilitate enduring family relationships. The
families described in this Section are here referred to as “families of
shared DNA.” The Section describes two sub-types.
1. DNA and Paternity: Abandoning the Marital Presumption 187
This sub-section considers one use of paternity tests in which facts
about DNA may prove determinative even as those facts upset
traditional expectations about family relationships and collide with

186. David Plotz notes that most sperm donors do not want to be social fathers to children
conceived through use of their sperm. PLOTZ, supra note 141, at 256-57.
187. The so-called “marital presumption” presumes that a woman’s husband is the father of her
children. “Lord Mansfield’s Rule” refused even to the spouses the right to rebut the presumption.
See ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY, AND STATE: PROBLEMS AND
MATERIALS ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW 162, 193-94 (5th ed. 2005).
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participants’ choices. 188 It considers the law’s increasing readiness to
acknowledge the paternal rights of men whose children’s mothers were
married to other men at the time of the children’s conception and/or
birth. 189 Increasingly, in these cases, courts and legislatures look to
presumptive biological “truths,” discerned through DNA testing, and
then provide for those “truths” to supplant traditional expectations about
paternity.
About two decades ago, the Supreme Court sided with traditional
understandings of family despite the opposing claims of both facts about
DNA and of parties’ nontraditional choices. In Michael H. v. Gerald D.,
the Court concluded that a biological father did not enjoy a
constitutional right to legal paternity in a case in which the child’s
mother was married to another man at the time of the child’s conception
and birth. 190 The Court’s decision reflects the social weight it gives to
the marital presumption – the presumption that a child’s father is the
man married to that child’s mother. 191 Proper fathers, Justice Scalia’s
opinion in Michael H. implies, have entered into a marriage or marriagelike 192 relationship with the mother of their children. 193 Therefore, in
the Court’s view, other “fathers,” – fathers such as Michael H., a
biological father unmarried to his child’s mother – have no moral, and
thus, it would seem, no legal, right to a parental relationship with their
genetic children. The decision strongly favors a view of family
structured around the marital relationship. 194
188. A fuller treatment of the subject might consider other uses of paternity tests – to determine
child support obligations, for instance, in cases in which a child’s mother is not married. That
analysis is beyond the scope of this Article.
189. Investigation of the use of paternity testing to identify a parent responsible for child
support provides another source of data for investigating social views about the significance of
DNA in a society that has welcomed autonomous individuality in the domestic arena. That
discussion is beyond the scope of this Article.
190. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 115 (1989) (upholding California statute that
provided that the child of a woman “cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is
conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage”) (quoting CAL. EVID. CODE § 621(a) (1989)).
Although the mother’s husband and the mother had a limited right to rebut the statute, a biological
father did not. Id.
191. See June Carbone, The Legal Definition of Parenthood: Uncertainty at the Core of Family
Identity, 65 LA. L. REV. 1295, 1315 (2005).
192. Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Michael H. referred to traditional families as “unitary
families.” Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123 n.3. The unitary family, he explained, is “[t]he family unit
accorded traditional respect in our society.” Id.
193. In fact, Judge Scalia’s plurality opinion referred to Michael, the nonmarital, biological
father, as an “adulterous natural father.” Id. at 127 n.6.
194. See Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood, 40 UCLA L.
REV. 637, 663-72 (1995) (analyzing the Court’s view of Michael H. in light of earlier Supreme
Court decisions about the parental rights of unmarried fathers).
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In the period since Michael H., state legislatures have limited the
reach of the marital presumption 195 and state courts, relying on state
constitutional provisions, have reached conclusions contrary to that
reached in Michael H. about the significance of the marital
presumption. 196
A decision of the Iowa Supreme Court, a decade after Michael H.,
is illustrative. In Callender v. Skiles, 197 Iowa’s highest court concluded
that the state’s constitution protects a biological father’s paternal interest
in a child born to a woman married to another man. 198 The court
premised that conclusion on what it perceived as a social shift away
from traditional understandings of family:
We acknowledge our society has not traditionally afforded parental
rights to persons like Charles [the biological father in the case]. . . .
Our constitution is not merely tied to tradition, but recognizes the
changing nature of society. The traditional ways to establish legal
parentage have dramatically changed in recent generations, as has the
traditional makeup of the family. Scientific advancements have
opened a host of complex family-related legal issues which have
changed the legal definition of a parent. It has also made the identity
of a biological parent a virtual certainty. Social stigmas have also
weakened. If we recognize parenting rights to be fundamental under
one set of circumstances, those rights should not necessarily disappear
simply because they arise in another set of circumstances involving
consenting adults that have not traditionally been embraced. Instead,
we need to focus on the underlying right at stake. The nontraditional
circumstances in which parental rights arise do not diminish the
traditional parental rights at stake. We therefore find Charles has a
199
liberty interest in challenging paternity.

Here, the Iowa court relied on facts about DNA to dethrone
Callender
traditional visions of paternity (and of marriage). 200
proclaims that safeguarding traditional forms of family is no longer of
primary concern to society or law, but it does not openly displace
195. Most states now allow the marital presumption to be rebutted. Moreover, under federal
law, the presumption can be rebutted if genetic test results suggest that a man other than the
mother’s husband is a child’s genetic father. See MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra note 187, at 167
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 666 (5)(G) (2002)).
196. See, e.g., Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 192 (Iowa 1999); Carbone, supra note
191, at 1317 (reporting that more than twenty states allow putative biological fathers the right to
establish paternity even when that right interferes with the marital presumptions).
197. 591 N.W.2d 182.
198. Id. at 192.
199. Id. at 190 (footnotes and citations omitted).
200. See Dolgin, supra note 194 at 663-72.
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tradition in the service of choice. 201 Rather, the court concluded that a
man’s biological (genetic) link to a child establishes a liberty interest
allowing the man to seek paternal rights. 202 In this context, paternal
rights are understood in terms of a universe that prizes individualism, not
community. Traditional understandings of paternity are thus re-situated
and re-shaped. Here, paternity no longer makes sense in the context of
an encompassing family structure but in light, only, of a man’s DNA.
The decision thus preserves one component of the traditional family
– that linked to understandings of biology – but it discards other
components central to understandings of the traditional family.
Callender acknowledges autonomous individuality in that the
biological father’s agency (manifest in the reproductive act that led to
the birth of the child that Charles, the putative biological father, sought
as his legal child) was important to the court’s conclusions. The court
framed Charles’s interest in paternity as a “liberty interest” – an
“interest” grounded firmly on a presumption of autonomous
individuality. Yet, the essence of Callender, as an anthropological
matter, is that genetics unhinges tradition. 203 Callender invokes the
power of genetic relationships in order to anchor a form of family that
displaces traditional expectations and demands.
The decision
acknowledges the role of individual agency, but it is DNA, not choice,
which effectively displaces tradition. Thus, Callender foreshadows a
theme that appears in a more worrisome form, in a set of cases and
declarations about “genetic families,” explored in Section D of this Part.
201. While unconcerned with choice, per se, the case does frame the significance of
reproductive agency (the fact of having conceived a child). The decision suggests that DNA along
with reproductive agency has consequences that must be acknowledged by the law even as they
contrast with traditional understandings of family.
202. In other cases, a similar view of the importance of genetics to paternity has led to the
imposition of paternal support obligations on men regarding children they would have preferred to
ignore. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Wilson v. Wilson, 855 So. 2d 913, 915 (La. Ct. App. 2003)
(obliging both biological father and mother’s husband to pay child support; the mother’s husband
married the mother when she was pregnant with biological father’s child).
203. Other states have become similarly ready to abandon or limit the marital presumption.
See Jana Singer, Marriage, Biology, and Paternity: The Case for Revitalizing the Marital
Presumption, 65 MD. L. REV. 246 (2006). Singer explains that:
[E]ven when courts acknowledge the [marital] presumption, they increasingly view it as
a procedural device or a rule of evidence, which can be overcome by convincing
evidence of contrary fact. Scientifically accurate DNA tests present precisely this sort of
convincing contrary evidence. And the increased ease and reduced cost of DNA testing
means that previously married parents who seek to disestablish paternity are increasingly
likely to come into court already armed with DNA evidence, rather than having to ask a
court to order testing. In the face of such “incontrovertible” scientific evidence, the
marital presumption is easily overcome.
Id. at 257-58 (footnotes omitted).
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2. Anonymous Sperm Donors 204 and “Sibling” Groups
In some part, understandings of genetic links explored in this
subsection provide a bridge between those underlying Callender and
those assumed in the construction of “medicalized families” described in
the next Section. “Donor families” 205 are a product of the increased
popularity, beginning in the 1980s, of assisted insemination using the
sperm of anonymous donors. 206 Often sperm banks mediate between
individuals or couples seeking sperm and sperm donors. Usually, sperm
banks identify anonymous donors through codes consisting of numbers,
letters, or colors. 207 Relying on such codes, donor-conceived children
have used the internet to search for donor relatives, including genetic
fathers and other children conceived through the sperm of the same man.
Since the 1980s, over a million children have been conceived in the
U.S. through anonymously donated sperm. 208 Those who have searched
204. A comparable analysis regarding a donor-sibling group created from the ova of one
woman is possible. There are now registries of egg donors. See, e.g., The Donor Sibling Registry,
www.donorsiblingregistry.com (last visited Dec. 16, 2007). Ova donation is more recent than
sperm donation and has led to fewer births. See SPAR, supra note 131, at 41-42. Eggs became
available in the early 1990s. Id.
205. Known donors are more likely to be recognized as legal parents than people who donate
gametes anonymously. A 2007 Irish case is illustrative. Danielle Hamm, Sperm Donor Seeks
July
18,
2007,
Custody
of
His
Biological
Son,
BIONEWS,
http://www.bionews.org.uk/new.lasso?storyid=3518. The donor had given sperm to a lesbian
couple in 2006. Id. The parties signed an agreement which gave the biological father visitation
rights. Id. He sought custody of the resulting child when his relationship with the couple
deteriorated. Id. In July 2007, an Irish court precluded the couple from taking the child to Australia
for a year. Id. A final decision awaits a custody hearing. Id.
206. See PLOTZ, supra note 141, at 167-81 (summarizing history of sperm banking in U.S.).
Plotz reports a study by the Office of Technology Assessment in the late 1980s which located
hundreds of sperm banks in the U.S. and estimated that about 30,000 children were being born each
year as a result of donor sperm. Id. at 170. By the late 1980s, largely, according to Plotz, as a result
of the influence of the Repository for Germinal Choice in California (the so-called “Nobel sperm
bank”), sperm banks began routinely to present themselves to end consumers as concerned with
safety (including donor testing) and consumer choice. Id. at 173.
Single women and women in lesbian relationships account for about 40% of the clients at
California Cryobank (perhaps the world’s largest sperm bank) and they account for about 75% of
clients at some other sperm banks. PLOTZ, supra note 141, at 178.
207. The Repository for Germinal Choice, the so-called “Nobel Prize Sperm Bank” about
which David Plotz wrote, identified donors by colors and numbers. Id. at xv. Thus, the bank’s
catalogue advertized a Donor White # 6 (described as a scientist who likes to read history); Donor
Coral # 36 (described as having a high I.Q. and as being good at math), and Donor Yellow/Brown #
22 (described as a “great scientist” who enjoys mountaineering). Id.
208. On the basis of at least 30,000 children born as a result of donor sperm each year since the
1980s, Plotz estimates that there may now be more than a million children in the U.S. conceived
with donor sperm. Id. at 170. One commentator suggests that at least 50,000 children conceived
from donor sperm are now born in the U.S. each year and that an average sperm donor is the genetic
parent of 26 children.
Paul DiLascia, How Many Children?, SPERMCENTER, 2006,
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for donor fathers have not usually identified the men they seek.
According to David Plotz, most anonymous sperm donors have no
interest in having social and/or legal children when they donate sperm,
and they do not develop such an interest later. 209 Searches for “donor
siblings” (other children conceived from the same donor’s sperm) have
been more successful. David Plotz reports one meeting in the early
1990s between what he refers to as two “sperm bank brothers.” 210 Plotz
believes the meeting may have been only the second or third time that
children conceived with sperm from the same anonymous donor had
met. 211 Plotz, who knew about the prospective meeting before it
occurred, imagined what it might be like:
Tom and Alton would be inventing an entirely new relationship: . . .
the sperm bank brother was something new. Regular half siblings
have a known father in common: They share a family history, a name,
a life. But sperm bank half brothers have only DNA in common; their
shared father is a complete blank. Coral [the sperm bank catalogue’s
label for the donor] was not a real person to Alton and Tom. They
didn’t even know his name. The only thing they knew about him was
that they didn’t know anything about him. 212

By now, the scenario that Plotz imagines, or a variant of it, has occurred
over and over.
Thousands of donor siblings have identified each other. 213 That
was due in some part to the pioneering efforts of Wendy Kramer, a
mother, anxious to help her son locate the man from whose sperm the
boy was conceived. 214 Kramer and her son created a website (called
Donor Sibling Registry) that assists children anxious to find donor
siblings and sperm donors. 215 Kay Hymowitz reports that 3,000 “donor
http://www.spermcenter.com/How%20Many%20Children.pdf.
209. PLOTZ, supra note 141, at 180. It has been much more common for those seeking donor
relatives to find donor siblings than sperm donors. Sperm donors have not often posted information
on relevant websites. Plotz writes: “For most American sperm donors, donating was something
they did when they were quite young in order to make money. Most didn’t spend a lot of time
pondering the consequences of their action, because they didn’t think there would be any. They
counted on anonymity to shield them forever.” Id.
210. Id. at 63.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See, e.g., The Donor Sibling Registry, supra note 204 (noting an active membership of
9,406 people and 3,873 “matches” between “half siblings (and/or donors)”).
214. The website created by Wendy Kramer and her son, Ryan, can be found at
http://donorsiblingregistry.com. See supra note 204.
215. Id. Kay S. Hymowitz, The Incredible Shrinking Father, 17 CITY JOURNAL (2007),
available at http://www.city-journal.org/html/17_2_artificial_insemination.html.
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mothers and children” have successfully relied on the site to locate
donor siblings or sometimes, but less often, donor fathers. 216
At least initially, those who identify donor relatives and the
relatives so identified view each other in light of a notion of family
constructed around suppositions about DNA and little else. Donor
siblings do not share social histories, biological mothers, social or legal
fathers, or even narratives about the genetic father’s motives for or
responses to becoming a sperm donor. In short, donor siblings share no
history with the sperm donor beyond the fact of the anonymous sperm
donation. 217
The effort to construct family relationships with sperm donors and
with donor siblings must contend with the essentially a-historic context
of anonymous sperm donation. The connection among donor siblings or
between a donor and the children produced from his sperm is not even
grounded in family narratives about a family-that-once-was. The
existence of a family is suggested only by suppositions about shared
DNA.
Sometimes, ongoing relationships are created among those who
find each other in the search for donor relatives. 218 But more often, it
seems, one party or another loses interest. Katrina Clark, a 17-year old
who easily identified and located her sperm donor father through the
internet, reports that, in the end, the man in question told her that he was
“tired of ‘this whole sperm-donor thing.’” 219 Clark concludes that,
ironically in her view, “[t]he very thing that brought us together was
pushing us in opposite directions.” 220 The irony that Clark identifies is
real. It lies in this donor child’s successful effort to locate – and name as
216. See supra note 209 (explaining why matches to sperm donors occur less frequently). The
site itself reports somewhat more successful “matches.” The Donor Sibling Registry, supra note
204.
217. See infra notes 218 - 222 and accompanying text (noting lack of social history among
donor relatives).
218. See, e.g., Jeff Stryker, Regulation or Free Markets?, SCIENCE PROGRESS, Nov. 7, 2007,
http://www.scienceprogress.org/2007/11/regulation-or-free-markets/; Katrina Clark, Who’s Your
Daddy? Mine Was An Anonymous Sperm Donor, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2006, at B01. Katrina
Clark uses the phrase genetic “roots” to refer to more than medical issues. Id. See also Amy
Harmon, Hello, I’m Your Sister: Our Father is Donor 150, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2005. Harmon
notes that some donor mothers have attempted to find other donor siblings and the mothers of those
children in order “to create a patchwork family for themselves and their children.” Id. She
describes one such group of woman as feeling connected by their children’s genetic connection and
by their having all participated in conception using donor sperm. Id. Such efforts to establish
family relationships from such donor-sibling groups move beyond the construct of the medicalized
family.
219. Clark, supra note 218.
220. Id.
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“father” – a man who, despite having posted his photo on a donor
website, had no intention of creating a family or of developing a new
familial relationship when he donated sperm, and no intention of
actualizing a family once identified by his genetic child. Yet, this man,
who had posted identifying information about himself on a donor
registry, presented himself as someone a donor child would identify as
“father.”
David Plotz’s study of donor relatives suggests that Katrina Clark’s
experience is typical. Children who identify donor fathers may try to
create enduring familial relationships with these men. 221 But almost all
of these donor children, according to David Plotz’s account, conclude,
after meeting donor fathers as well as donor siblings, that – the
presumptive promise embedded in genetic links notwithstanding – they
have little in common with their “donor relatives.” And most thus
conclude, finally, that they are uninterested in, or even if interested,
unlikely to develop longstanding relationships with such donor
relatives. 222 Plotz’s reports suggest that donor families constitute a new
type of virtual family.
Sometimes donor children acknowledge two distinct family groups,
one constructed through choice and commitment and a second created
through biological chance. One mother of two children conceived
through donor sperm, one of whom had an identified donor sibling,
explains that her two children (with different donor fathers) have a
“strong sibling bond that comes from living together and making a
family.” 223 But, she added, the child whose donor sibling had been
identified, also had a biological sibling who “wasn’t really [the child’s]
brother” but who shares the child’s “origins.” 224 This mother explained
that she seeks a “language” that “will respect our nuclear family yet
acknowledge the biological relationship [with a ‘donor half-sibling’]”. 225
She thus aimed to define two distinct family groups but not, it would
seem, to embed one in the other or to mediate the distinction between the
221. See, e.g., Wendy Kramer, Ryan and Anna, Two Half Siblings Meet,
http://donorsiblingregistry.com/ryanandanna.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2007). According to
Kramer’s account, her son, Ryan, and his donor sibling, Anna, formed a close bond after meeting as
adolescents. Id. The account is, however, of only one meeting. Id. It is thus unclear whether or
not the relationship developed over time as Kramer’s report presumed it would. Id.
Only one donor father among those whom David Plotz interviewed seemed likely to
remain connected with a donor child with whom he had connected. PLOTZ, supra note 141, at 20412.
222. PLOTZ, supra note 141, at 213-33.
223. Lisa DiGirolamo, Donor Sibling, 11 OUR FAMILY COALITION NEWSLETTER 2 (2006).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 11.
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two.
In other cases people do not seek donor relatives because they
yearn for family relationships but because they want medical
information. Such searches have resulted in the identification of large
“medicalized” 226 family groups. Because sperm from one donor may be
used to conceive dozens of children, the size of medicalized sibling
groups can be very large. 227 Sometimes, the diseases involved may be
serious. One family sued the California Cryobank for failing to inform
them that the donor (number 267) whose sperm they used to conceive
their daughter, by then an adolescent, had a family history of autosomal
dominant polycystic kidney disease (ADPKD). 228 The donor’s aunt and
mother died of the condition and an ultrasound of the donor’s kidneys
(taken before his sperm was used) had revealed multiple cysts,
suggesting that he suffered or would soon suffer from ADPKD. 229 The
donor himself, whose sperm had been used by a number of other clients
of the bank, refused to provide information or to take a blood test that
would have provided additional information about the severity of his
condition. Such information would have been useful to predict the
course of the illness for the children conceived from the donor’s
sperm. 230
In another case, a woman chose a donor with blond hair and green
eyes because she wanted a child with those characteristics. 231 She gave
birth to a son with very different coloring. However, the child
resembled the sperm donor (which the mother discovered later) in
suffering from an unusual genetic platelet disorder 232 and from a related
assortment of troublesome allergies. 233 Through the Donor Sibling
Registry, the child’s mother eventually tracked down several other

226. Carl Elliott sees the origin of “medicalization” in “refer[ences] to the way that a society
manages deviant behavior by bringing it under the medical umbrella.” CARL ELLIOTT, BETTER
THAN WELL: AMERICAN MEDICINE MEETS THE AMERICAN DREAM 228-29 (2003). Medicalization
turns people who are not sick into patients. The form of medicalization at issue in this Section is
specific to that resulting from the identification of genetic alterations that pose a risk of illness.
227. Jennifer Wolff, The Truth About Donor 1084: Angry Mothers Say Sperm Banks Are
Hiding Evidence of Donors’ Genetic Defects, SELF MAGAZINE (2006), available at
http://www.self.com/magazine/articles/2006/10/23/1006donor_single_page.
228. Johnson v. California Cryobank, Inc., 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). See
also Wolff, supra note 227
229. Johnson, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650.
230. Wolff, supra note 227.
231. Id.
232. Id. The condition in question is delta storage pool deficiency. It causes easy bleeding and
bruises. Id.
233. Id.
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families who had used sperm from the same donor – referred to as donor
number 1084. 234 A number of the children created with this donor’s
sperm have suffered from similar health problems. 235
Medicalized families are usually identified within the context of
existing families. The next Section considers some of the consequences
of constructing familial groups through reference to shared deleterious
genetic alterations.
D. The “Medicalized Family”
The observation that several members of a family have become ill
with a condition categorized as “familial” (now called “genetic”) may
result in the medicalization of family groups. 236 Kaja Finkler’s
anthropological study of medicalized (genetic) families shows how the
revelation of information about deleterious genetic alterations 237 within
families can stimulate new modes of interaction among those
involved. 238 But even in the context of ongoing family units, Finkler
reports that within medicalized families, the a-historicity and a-morality
of DNA may compete with, and even displace, social memory. 239
The medicalization of kinship binds the person to the past as well as to
the future – even though, ironically, the tie is mediated by suffering –
propelling people to search for ancestors and also to anticipate future
afflicted descendants . . . . Lamentably, the DNA harboring memory of
ancestors is devoid of morality or affect, the hallmark of family and
kinship relations. DNA molecules are inherently impersonal: they do
not impose, express, or insist on responsibilities, obligations, or love,
other than requiring living relatives to furnish blood samples in order
240
to establish genetic markers on chromosomes.

Thus, Finkler’s ethnographic investigation revealed a remarkable
consequence of genetic medicalization. Focus on shared DNA within
ongoing families may displace the bonds created through social
interaction and thus redefine the “family” for those involved.

234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See KAJA FINKLER, EXPERIENCING THE NEW GENETICS: FAMILY AND KINSHIP ON THE
MEDICAL FRONTIER 106-62 (2000).
237. See Beatrice Godard, et al., Guidelines for Disclosing Genetic Information to Family
Members: From Development to Use, 5 FAMILIAL CANCER 103, 110 (2006) (noting increasing
availability of genetic tests). See also, supra notes 146 - 156.
238. FINKLER, supra note 236, at 184.
239. Id. at 187.
240. Id.
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The form of family considered in this Section – the “medicalized
family” – resembles aspects of the two sub-types of family described in
the previous Section. However, families considered in the last Section
(both families constructed on the basis of paternity testing and donor
families) preserve some role, even if more implicit than explicit, for
agency and choice. As a construct, the form of family considered in this
Section provides no place for choice.
The medicalized family reflects yet another form of family that has
developed in the last several decades and that relies centrally on a
presumption about biological “truths.” The medicalized family suggests
a vision of family that values neither tradition nor choice.
Understandings of biology underlying the notion of medicalized
families resemble those associated with traditional families in that
medicalized families view biology (DNA) as a substance that, when
shared, joins people together in presumptive familial groups. But
understandings of the shared substance (DNA) associated with
medicalized families differ dramatically from those associated with
traditional families, and resemble those associated with modern families,
in that they are predicated on the valuation of individualism, not
communal holism. The medicalized family also differs from modern
“families of choice,” however in that in its very formulation, the
medicalized family precludes any role for autonomous choice.
Construction of the medicalized family gained support in the last
decades of the twentieth century with the advent of tests for deleterious
genetic alterations. 241 Biotechnology has thus transformed what were
once known loosely as “familial” diseases into conditions associated
with genetic alterations that can be identified in particular individuals or
in the putative genome of larger groups. Thus, such genetic alterations
and the diseases to which they may give rise may be associated not only
with individuals but with familial groups and even with groups
identified through reference to ethnicity, race, or nationality. 242 Through
genetic testing, deleterious genetic alterations can be identified with
certainty, but generally the risks presented by such genetic identification
are far murkier. People identified as being at risk for particular illnesses
because they bear deleterious genetic alterations may not be, and may

241. See supra note 237 (considering deleterious genetic alterations).
242. See Ellen Wright Clayton, What Should the Law Say About Disclosure of Genetic
Information to Relatives, 1 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 373, 373 (1998) (noting that family
members of someone diagnosed with a genetic condition are more likely than others to be “similarly
affected”).
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never become, ill with the conditions in question. 243 Yet, once family
members know that they may carry a deleterious genetic alteration
predisposing them to a potentially serious illness, they may see
themselves and be seen by others (assuming others are aware of the
family’s genetic risk) as patients or potential patients. 244
Genetic tests provide information. From a social perspective, that
information is peculiar. Genetic information is unique to a particular
person. Yet, it may also be invoked to identify or describe wider social
groups, defined through shared genes. 245 Genetic families, identified
through reference to genetic information, provide a remarkable social
construct. From the perspective of shared genetic information, each
person is equivalent to every other person in the larger familial group.
Moreover, and more remarkable still, each person (viewed from a
genomic perspective) is equivalent to the whole. 246 This Section
considers the troubling implications of the ideological construct that
underlies this vision of family.
The potential for new and discomforting understandings of families
as units, identified through reference to genetic alterations and the
diseases with which they are associated, 247 is illustrated dramatically by
Safer v. Pack, 248 decided in 1996 by a New Jersey appellate court.
Genetic diseases have raised questions about the obligation of physicians
or of patients identified as having such diseases (or of having deleterious
genetic alternations or a family history associated with such diseases) to
inform patients and/or patients’ family members about the risk. 249 Safer
was occasioned by this sort of question. 250
243. Alissa Brownrigg, Note, Mother Still Knows Best: Cancer-Related Gene Mutations,
Familial Privacy, and a Physician’s Duty to Warn, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 247, 249-50 (1999)
(noting increasing reliance on genetic testing in routine health care).
244. See FINKLER, supra note 236 at 160-62 (anthropological analysis of genetic inheritance
based on studies of adoptee and of women with familial breast cancer).
245. See Gatter, supra note 6, at 428 (noting difference between genetic information and “other
types of information” in that, among other things, genetic information “invokes the interests of the
family as well as the individual”); Patricia A. Roche & George J. Annas, Protecting Genetic
Privacy, 2 NATURE REVIEWS 392, 393 (2001).
246. See infra notes 248 - 272 and accompanying text (considering “family” assumed by court
in Safer v. Pack, 677 A.2d 1188 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996)).
247. Further, larger ethnic and racial groups are being defined through reference to genetic
alterations associated with members of the group in question. See supra note 242.
248. Safer v. Pack, 677 A.2d 1188 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
249. See, e.g., Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So.2d 278, 282 (Fla. 1995) (allowing woman with
hereditary condition to sue her mother’s doctor for having failed to inform the mother that her
condition was genetic; the daughter was not allowed to argue that the doctor was obliged to warn
her directly).
250. Safer, 677 A.2d at 1190.
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In 1990, Donna Safer was diagnosed with metastatic colon
cancer. 251 Twenty-six years earlier, when Safer was ten, her father,
Robert Batkin, died from that disease. 252 Batkin was then forty-five
years old. 253 After Donna’s diagnosis, she sued Dr. George Pack. 254 Dr.
Pack had treated Batkin during the course of Batkin’s illness. 255 Dr.
Pack had never served as Safer’s physician, but she contended that he
was obliged to have warned her (presumably through her mother,
Batkin’s wife) of the hereditary character of her father’s illness. 256 Had
she been aware that she was at risk for multiple polyposis and thus for
developing colon cancer, she would presumably have undergone
frequent colon screenings in the hope of preventing or mitigating the
consequences of colon cancer.
Donna (along with her husband, Robert Safer, himself a physician)
claimed that the hereditary character of Batkin’s illness was known
when Batkin was ill, and that prevailing medical practice was “to warn
those at risk.” 257 Donna’s mother, Ida Batkin, testified that she had not
been told that her husband suffered from colon cancer. 258 The New
Jersey trial court dismissed Donna’s suit, concluding that the doctor was
not under a “legal duty to warn a child of a patient of a genetic risk[.]” 259
The appellate court reversed, expressing “confiden[ce] that the duty
to warn of avert[a]ble risk from genetic causes, by definition a matter of
familial concern, is sufficiently narrow to serve the interests of
justice.” 260 The surprising aspect of the Safer court’s decision was that
the duty to warn of the genetic risk was not defined as being owed to the
doctor’s patient alone but as owed directly to “members of the
immediate family of the patient who may be adversely affected by a
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. The suit was brought against Dr. Pack’s estate. Pack had died in 1969. Id.
255. Id. at 1189.
256. The duty, had it been imposed, would presumably have been to warn Donna’s mother of
the risk. The court noted expressly that it was uncertain as to how exactly the physician’s “duty is
to be discharged, especially with respect to young children who may be at risk, except to require
that reasonable steps be taken to assure that the information reaches those likely to be affected or is
made available for their benefit.” Id. at 1192.
257. Id. at 1190.
258. Id. Ida Batkin’s testimony was especially relevant in that Donna was a young girl when
her father died. Thus, any duty to warn her would likely have been fulfilled by warning Donna’s
mother.
259. Id. The motion judge assumed that Donna’s father did not know of the genetic character
of his illness in light of the absence of evidence that Batkin had been told about the risk to family
members. Id.
260. Id. at 1192.
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breach of that duty.” 261 The court expressly rejected the more limited
ruling of the Florida Supreme Court in Pate v. Threlkel, a similar sort of
case. 262 In Pate, the court required only that the patient herself be told
about the genetic risk that her illness posed for close relatives. 263
In other cases, courts have imposed an obligation on a physician to
warn a pediatric patient’s parents about a genetic risk (especially to other
children of the same parents) associated with a child’s illness. 264 The
implications of that obligation differ dramatically from those of Safer.
In Safer, the court required a patient’s physician to communicate
information to a patient’s child about the parent’s illness. 265 That
obligation, unlike a similar obligation imposed on a child’s doctor to
inform the child’s parents about a genetic risk, challenges expectations
about privacy within family settings and suggests a family unit that
differs significantly from that associated with the traditional family
(within which parents were routinely provided with information about
their children’s health and welfare). 266
The medicalized family assumed by the Safer court 267 differs from
261. Id. (quoting Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 65 (N.J. 1981)). A year before the decision
in Safer, the Florida Supreme Court held a doctor responsible for failing to warn his patient about
the risk to family members from a condition the patient suffered from. Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So.2d
278 (Fla. 1995). But in Pate, the court did not extend that obligation to warning family members of
the patient. That task was left to the patient. The court explained:
Our holding should not be read to require the physician to warn the patient’s children of
the disease. In most instances the physician is prohibited from disclosing the patient’s
medical condition to others except with the patient’s permission. Moreover, the patient
ordinarily can be expected to pass on the warning. To require the physician to seek out
and warn various members of the patient’s family would often be difficult or impractical
and would place too heavy a burden upon the physician. Thus, we emphasize that in any
circumstances in which the physician has a duty to warn of a genetically transferable
disease, that duty will be satisfied by warning the patient.
Id. at 282 (citations omitted).
262. Safer, 677 A.2d at 1192.
263. Id.
264. Molloy v. Meier, 679 N.W.2d 711, 719 (Minn. 2004) (imposing duty on doctor of young
patient with Fragile X Syndrome to warn biological parents that subsequent child could have same
condition); Schroeder v. Perkel, 432 A.2d 834, 839-40 (NJ. 1981) (imposing independent duty on
physician to warn parents of young patient with cystic fibrosis that a subsequent child might suffer
from the same illness).
265. Safer, 677 A.2d at 1192.
266. Even more, within the setting of the traditional family, wives were not always entitled to
medical privacy from their husbands. See, e.g., Tooley v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 154
So.2d 617, 618 (La. Ct. App. 1963) (defining husband as “head and master of the community” and
thus privy to medical information about his wife).
267. A 1998 statement of the American Society of Human Genetics (ASHG) reflects a similar
view of the medicalized family. American Society of Human Genetics Social Issues Subcommittee
on Familial Disclosure, ASHG Statement: Professional Disclosure of Familial Genetic Information,
62 AM. J. HUM. GENET. 474 (1998). That group recommended that normal rules of confidentiality
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both the traditional family and many contemporary families, defined by
widespread insistence on an increasingly broad panoply of choices. The
family assumed in Safer is a whole, composed of identical units, each
indistinguishable (from the perspective of DNA) from the others and
from the larger whole.
This family is not structured through
expectations about hierarchy and community, as is the traditional family.
Nor is it composed of autonomous individuals, increasingly understood
as agents of choice, each distinct from each of the others – a
presumption familiar to families of choice.
The family assumed by the Safer court views separate persons
through the lens of a larger group (in the Safer case, a familial group),
identified through reference to shared DNA. As such, members of such
groups are indistinguishable, each from the others. That is evident in the
readiness of the Safer court to assume that no one within such a group
need enjoy medical privacy from others in the group. Donna Safer,
Robert Batkin’s daughter, is entitled to know about her father’s illness
because, from the perspective of the medicalized family, there is no
difference between the two. This construct of family bears some
resemblance to “families of shared DNA” (described in Section C of this
Part). 268 Yet, the medicalized family described in this Section is
peculiar even in comparison to other forms of family identified through
invocation of genetic “facts.” Genetic families sit uneasily within the
array of family forms examined in this Article, because they value
individualism while failing almost completely to value, or even to
recognize, choice.
As a practical matter, the medicalized family assumed in Safer is
actualized in the restricted setting of medical conditions associated with
genetic alterations. 269 Yet, as an ideological matter, this form of family
is a remarkable and troubling construct. It reflects a broader ideological
be set aside and that health care workers have the “discretionary right” to reveal information about
hereditary conditions to patients’ family members. Id. at 474. This rule differs from that voiced in
Safer in that it is discretionary, not mandatory. Id. The society identified “at-risk relatives” to
whom such disclosure might be made to include siblings and children as well as “identifiable
parents, cousins, aunts, and uncles, whom the health-care professional can reasonably contact.” Id.
268. If it resembles any other form of family in this regard, it is the form of “donor” family,
described in the next subsection of this Section.
269. Kaja Finkler provides a focused account of medicalized families. She describes such
families as ongoing social units: “in the past, the family was identified by honor, status, power, or
even poverty, whereas in contemporary times family and kin tend to be stabilized and bounded by
the sharing of DNA molecules, which lack the moral responsibilities associated with relatedness.”
FINKLER, supra note 236, at 206. See also Janet L. Dolgin, Choice, Tradition, and the New
Genetics: The Fragmentation of the Ideology of Family, 32 CONN. L. REV. 523, 563-65 (2000)
(describing this aspect of Safer in more detail).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol41/iss2/2

48

Dolgin: Biological Evaluations
DOLGIN_FINAL

2008]

3/23/2009 2:51 PM

BIOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS

395

frame within which individualism is preserved because the whole is
understood through the metaphor of the individual, and each person’s
autonomy is sacrificed to that of the whole.
One might think that the medicalized family described here is
understood at the level of the whole and thus, as an ideological matter,
reflects a form of community, or more particularly, a form of
totalitarianism rather than of individualism. A similar error was
described by Louis Dumont, a French anthropologist known for his
studies of caste in India. 270 Dumont reviewed understandings of the
ideology that informs totalitarianism in the West. In describing the
ideology underlying a fascist state, Dumont wrote:
A major difficulty in the effort to grasp totalitarianism comes from the
spontaneous tendency to consider it a form of holism. The word itself
refers us at first sight to the social “totality”; and the regime, in its
contrast to democracy, is first thought of as “reaction,” a return to the
past. These are vulgar notions. . . . [A]s the totalitarian regime
constrains its subjects most radically, it appears to oppose
individualism in the current meaning of the term, so the analyst is
faced with a contradiction. To solve it, one should remember that the
phenomenon is internal to the modern world, that the totalitarian
ideology is contained within modern ideology. The hypothesis is that
totalitarianism results from the attempt, in a society where
individualism is deeply rooted and predominant, to subordinate it to
271
the primacy of the society as a whole.

Obviously, the dangers of fascism differ from and would seem to be
more encompassing than those of the medicalized family. 272 However,
each social form resembles the other in that its survival depends on
“subordinating” (to use Dumont’s word) the individual to the group, and
thus undermines individual autonomy.
The family defined in Safer, depends on a form of individualism –
one that views the whole through the metaphor of the individual and
each individual as substitutable for each other individual (and for the
larger whole). Although the medicalized family continues to value
individualism (though in a troubling guise), it virtually precludes the sort
of choice associated with autonomous personhood.
Thus, the
medicalized family provides an almost paradigmatic instance of a social
270. DUMONT, supra note 10, at 12.
271. Id. (emphasis in original).
272. This claim follows, in part, because the medicalized family is not the only form of family
recognized in the society. Were that ever to be the case (and it is hard indeed to imagine), it would
be as troubling indeed.
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form, constructed in light of the presumed significance of DNA that
favors individualism, but not choice.
V. CONCLUSION
The “traditional family,” forged in the early nineteenth century and
elaborated during the rest of that century and during much of the next
century, was structured within a broad ideological 273 frame that prized
hierarchy and communal holism. As that ideological frame collapsed in
the last decades of the twentieth century, so did the traditional family.
The forms through which the notion of family was once understood have
grown murky. Discrete values once associated with the traditional
family survive but are no longer understood through reference to a larger
set of structured social truths. Even more, both the biological and social
parameters of family survive, but no longer does either set of parameters
inform the other. In the traditional family, assumptions about biology
shaped and reflected assumptions about social behavior. In the forms of
family described in this Article, that is not true or it is true only
incidentally.
And so, old values have been reshaped, and new values have been
added to social understandings of family. A wide variety of conflicting
ideological presumptions is now invoked in the construction of various
forms of family. All of those considered in Part IV preserve a vital role
for some understanding of biological connection. Yet each differs from
the others as much as each differs from the form of family referred to as
“traditional.”
Society and the law struggle to construct a frame, or more
accurately, a set of frames, within which to understand and regulate
family relationships. In consequence, old beliefs about family are
combined with new ones. Various aspects of family life (e.g., the social
correlates of family and the biological correlates of family) merge and
shift. And an assemblage of assorted values – some culled from the
universe of the traditional family, some taken from the world of the
marketplace, and others developed only in the last few decades – is
variously molded to create new forms of family.
As a result, ideological constructs for understanding and defining
families have proliferated. This Article focuses on four such constructs.
Each of these depends on the centrality of biology to the construction of
family. In that regard, each variant may seem disconcerting insofar as

273. See supra note 10 (defining “ideology”).
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forms of family that have emerged in the last several decades are
generally seen as having discarded or downplayed the notion that
biological relationship is or should be central to definitions of family.
The presumptive form of the modern family in the U.S. – the family of
choice – has received significant attention from theorists and popular
commentators. This Article suggests that alongside such families of
choice other forms of family subordinate choice to biology, re-define
choice in light of biology, or even, in at least one construction of family,
eviscerate choice altogether.
The first form of family considered in Part IV, the “flesh and blood
family,” depends on viewing DNA (or genes) as a synonym for “blood”
or “flesh and blood” – for an old-fashioned understanding of biology’s
role in the construction of family. In this guise, the concept of DNA
supports understandings of family that do not appear to differ
dramatically from those assumed during the previous two centuries. In
sharp contrast, understandings of DNA that undergird the “reprogenetic
family” depend on society’s compulsion to identify and to appropriate
choices. That compulsion is long familiar within the marketplace.
And at still other times, the presumptive significance of DNA
mitigates the role of choice in the construction of family. This process is
reflected in “families of shared DNA” (including both families defined
through paternity testing in contravention of the traditional martial
presumption and donor families). Moreover, while those seeking to
define themselves within such families seem often to long for connection
and loyalty, that has not generally happened (especially among donor
relatives). In the end, the presumptive genetic links on which such
families rest seem more often to define the individuals who seek to
construct “families of shared DNA” than to shape lasting family units.
Even more, a new form of family – the medicalized family – reflects
individualist values while eviscerating choice.
In sum, any sense that understandings of family in the U.S. have
been effectively recast in the language of choice alone is belied by the
important role preserved for the presumed biological correlates of
family. Yet, even among these four views of family, each defined
centrally through reference to presumed biological truths, significant
differences distinguish each form of family from the other three.
Perhaps one form of family will ultimately be deemed the successor
to the nineteenth and twentieth century family, developed to support the
interests of the industrial marketplace (the so-called traditional family).
Perhaps that form of family will venerate choice. Perhaps it will be
founded on presumed biological truths. Perhaps it will be created
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through a novel set of suppositions. More likely, the notion of family
will continue at least for a time to encompass a discordant set of beliefs
about the essence of personhood and about the forms through which
people define themselves as kin, and the forms through which people
join together to create “families.”
In consequence, ideological
disquietude characterizes the law and society’s attempts to understand
and regulate contemporary families.
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